California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks
Theses Digitization Project

John M. Pfau Library

1992

An analysis of plea bargaining
Gabriela Aceves

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Aceves, Gabriela, "An analysis of plea bargaining" (1992). Theses Digitization Project. 744.
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/744

This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

PLEA

BARGAINING

A THESIS PROJECT
PRESENTED

TO THE

FACULTY OF

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
SAN BERNARDINO

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in

Criminal Justice

by
Gabriela Aceves

AN

ANALYSIS OF PLEA BARGAINING

A Thesis Project
Presented to the

Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

by
Gabriela

Aceves

February 1992

Approved by«

^LtNz .
Frances S. Coles, Professor,
Department of Criminal Justice

Frank P. Williams, Chair,
Department of Criminal Justice

I

Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Frances S. Coles for her patience

and guidance throughout the eight months of putting together this

thesis project.

I would also like to thank Dr. Frank P. Williams

for his guidance during the four years that I was at California
State University, San Bernardino.

to my

husband,

Daniel

patience throughout.
for their support.

J.

Special acknowledgement goes

Lopez,

Further,

for

his

understanding

I would like to thank

and

my parents

INTRODUCTIOH

The

purpose of

bargaining.

In the

between

the

covered

readings

Blumberg,

this Master's

analyze plea

analysis journal articles and

years 1956

and

Project was to

from

to 1990

were

historical

Newman to

more

books written

reviewed.

writers

The analysis

such

recent authors

as

such

Sudnow,

as Casper,

Feeley, and Heumann.

One of the primary goals of this project was to find ways in
which

the court system could

plea bargaining material
insight into how

plea

plea bargaining began.

workgroups.

the

bargaining

The review also

plea bargaining was used for
affected

a good

criminal

shows

and shows

justice

courtroom

The analysis covers articles and books which examine

perspectives

police,

Reading

from various perspectives gives

the different areas that
how

operate more efficiently.

and the

of

the prosecutor,

defendant.

served as comparative

Several of

public

Felstiner have found,

In

defender,

the articles

material about plea bargaining

used in the United States.

other than the

judge,

reviewed
procedures

fact, as Baldwin & McConville and

plea bargaining occurs in

United States.

Although the

other countries

practice may

have

another name, plea bargaining nonetheless occurs.

Another goal in
the

criminal

this project was

justice

system

to examine ways in

could

bargaining, and the

implications of such

Rosett

discuss

and Cressey

in JUSTICE

operate

without

a procedure.
BY

appears that plea bargaining is here to stay.

which
plea

But,

as

CONSENT (1976),

it

Rosett and Cressey

argue that plea

bargaining occurs

often.

most citizens have had some experience

appearing in court in response to
In
pay

such a case,

also note

that

with the guilty plea from

a traffic ticket, for example.

it appears easier to

a fine and go

They

home rather than

citizens to plead guilty,
pleading not guilty because

another visit to the courthouse would be necessary.

The journal articles,
in any

book analyses, and abstracts

specific order of importance.

analysis and abstracts

It

in chronological

are not

was decided to put the
order.

In

conclusion,

this review will allow the reader to examine the process

of plea

J

bargaining in the court, and the impact of plea bargaining on the
other components of the criminal justice system.

PLEADING GUILTY FOR CONSIDERATIONS.DONALD

A STUDY OF BARGAIN JUSTICE

J. NEWMAN
1956

One

of the

studying

major problems

criminal

offenders to

behavior

be used

faced by

involved

as units

or

have been

obtaining

of research.

samples are drawn from those who
who are

social

scientists in

samples

Ordinarily,

of

such

have already been convicted and

previously

incarcerated.

Such

samples

usually arise because it is difficult to study those who have not
yet been caught, charged, and convicted.
Newman's article discusses plea bargaining as a gross misuse

of

justice which is used by

the business elite

interviewed

a

to avoid a conviction.

sample

"conventional" felonies

process involved in
from

a

"medium"

normally

follow a

criminals, political officials, and

of

men

in one court

their own
size

county

in

a

combative,

his study, Newman

all

where felony

These

97 men

theory of

of

to the

convictions

came
would

criminal

at least an unconditional plea

convictions, 93.8 percent were not

trial-by-jury

sense, but

involved sentencing after a plea of guilty had been

is important

convicted

district in regard

quasi-automatic "combat"

In studying these

convictions

were

convictions.

justice involving a jury trial or
of guilty.

who

In

merely

entered.

It

to note that 38.1 percent of the men had originally

entered a not

guilty plea, changing

to guilty

only at a

later

procedural stage of an actual trial.

An interesting difference between those
and those who pled guilty
initial

plea

represented by
pled

of

not

guilty

The men

apprehended often

with

pled not

The fact that the

change of plea

were

them

followed their advice.

often

immediately

(52.6%) when

later changed

first

to guilty

mean that the lawyers,

worth of the

to plead

having a

evidence against

guilty

and

Another indicator

change their pleas would be that
district attorney

men who

lawyers

guilty and

more

an

retention of counsel correlated with a

the legal

advised

significantly

than the

the

to guilty might

better grasp of
clients,

For instance, men entering

defense attorneys

guilty.

pleas.

arose.

who pled not guilty

that

their

the clients

of why offenders would

attorneys had arranged with the

satisfactory charges or more lenient sentences

then originally expected by the offenders.

In most cases, these

offenders were first time offenders.

The second group; those who pled guilty without counsel were

offenders, in most cases, who had some prior experiences with the
criminal justice system.

guilty)

that

their

conviction process.

These

cases

would

recidivists hoped (by

expediently

These recidivists

and conviction susceptible

in the dual

the possibility of bargaining a guilty
and at the same

through

the

were both conviction wise
sense that they knew

of

plea for a light sentence

time were vulnerable, because of

to threats of the prosecutor

go

pleading

their records,

to "throw the book" at them

unless

they confessed.

A more general fear, however, was that the judge

would be especially

severe in sentencing

if they did decide

to

fight and then lost.

The considerations received by the

offender in exchange for

their guilty pleas were of four general typesi
1.

Bargaining

entered

by

concerning the

the offenders

charge.

in exchange

A plea

for

of guilty

a reduction

was

of the

charge from one alleged in the complaint.
2.

Bargaining concerning

the sentence.

A plea of

guilty was

entered by the offenders in exchange for a promise of leniency in
sentencing.

3.

Bargain for

concurrent charges.

A guilty plea exchange for

the concurrent pressing of multiple charges.
4.

Bargain for dropped

charges.

Involved an agreement

part of the prosecutor not to press formally
against the

offender if

he in

turn

on the

one or more charges

pled guilty

to the

major

offense.

In instances where

various

That

informal methods were

participants

is,

defendants

were

cooperative

and their

used the roles of

rather than

counsel

the

combative.

participated

with the

prosecutor's position rather than demanding a trial.
In

finding

concluding

of

the

convictions in the

his

study

article, the

was

that

most

the majority

district studied were

formal, combative theory

significant general

of criminal law

of

the

felony

not the result of

the

involving in effect

a

legal battle between prosecution and defense, but were compromise

convictions, and

prosecution.

the result

of bargaining

between defense

and

Instead of proceeding through all the formal stages

of conviction

such as a hearing before a magistrate, preliminary

hearing, arraignment etc.,
most of these procedures

the majority of the

offenders waived

partly due to the informal

leniency or threat of long sentences.

promises of

Hence, they entered guilty

pleas.

In reviewing the

1iterature, Donald Newman's study

bargaining is considered to be a

of plea

classic piece of research.

His

findings help to portray many of the injustices which occurred in
1956.

Further,

bargaining

Newman

is legal;

discusses

that is,

an

issue of

whether

whether people convicted

result of bargaining are convicted by due process of law.

plea

as the

THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS CONFIDENCE GAMEi ORGANIZATIONAL
COOPTATION OF A PROFESSION
ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG
1966

Blumberg
decisions
in

the

gives

a

brief

description

of

three

landmark

which impacted criminal law procedures and enforcement
United

States

of America.

The

first

is Gideon

v.

Wainwriqht {1963) which required states and localities to furnish
counsel in the

case of indigent

persons charged with a

In Escobedo v.

Illinois (1964), an

important issue arose as

when or at what point in

time is a suspect entitled to

In Escobedo v. Illinois.

the US Supreme Court held

was to

be

permitted (either

felony.

retained

to

counsel.

that counsel

or appointed)

when

the

process of police investigations shifts from merely investigatory
to that of accusatory.
Miranda

v. Arizona

permitted

The third case presented

(1966).

In

this case,

prior to police interrogations as

by Blumberg is

counsel

is to

be

required by the 5th

Amendment.

The purpose of Blumberg's article
evidence of

the role of

deals with social reality.

is to furnish preliminary

a counselor and to

see if such

a role

Blumberg states that the overwhelming

majority of convictions in criminal cases

are not the product of

a combative, trial-by-jury process but rather a sentencing of the
individual after a
been entered.

negotiated, bargained-for plea of

In fact,

when

an accused

guilty has

person goes

to

his

lawyer, the lawyer seems to merely
situation and restructure

guilty plea.
retained

or

help the accused redefine his

his perceptions

Hence,

the defense

a public

defender,

in accordance with

attorneys, whether
are ultimately

a

privately

concerned with

strategies which tend to lead to a plea of guilty.
Blumberg also mentioned

in

the

court, the

only

that of all the

private individual

recognized as having a special

is the defense lawyer.
the court,

occupational roles

who

is officially

status and concomitant obligation

He has a duty to his client as well as to

"Regular" lawyers are those who work on

basis who constantly
caseloads of

handle case

defendants

large numbers

of cases,

clients to plead

workloads.

produce intense

hence, lawyers

guilty as a way

a day-to-day

Intolerably

pressures

to

large

process

usually convince

their

to reduce such pressures.

In

all reality, much plea bargaining occurs.

Blumberg discusses the
of a
fee

key issue of understanding

defense lawyer as it pertains to
to

be

Blumberg

charged and

how

such

the process of fixing the

a fee

is

introduces the "confidence game"

instance, a

lawyer

services are paid

will not

for prior to

contact the defendant's

the role

represent a

to

be collected.

which is played.

For

defendant unless

his

going to court.

Lawyers

often

next of kin in order to get their money.

Since a typical felony case which results in merely a guilty plea
ranges

anywhere from

$500 to

$1,500, many

known to contribute to the lawyer's
that the courtroom work

fee.

family members

Blumberg also mentions

group assists the lawyer in

8

are

getting his

fee by putting on a "performance" so as to make it seem as if the

lawyer is

really working.

Further,

judges are

defendants "locked up" a little longer

known to

keep

or until a defense lawyer

is paid for his services.

Blumberg

mentions

that

criminal

bureaucratic, assembly-line fashion.

an assembly-line fashion

case

workload

so as to

which involve

law

operates

in

a

Defendants are processed in

relieve the attorneys of

much pressure.

In fact,

the

a good

defense lawyer will be able to persuade the defendant's family to

help him/her persuade the defendant to plead guilty.
In conclusion, Blumberg mentions, in

major functions which a
the lawyer must

his article, the three

defense lawyer must serve.

arrange for his fee; 2)

They

are 1)

the lawyer must prepare

and then, if necessary,

"cool off" his client in case of defeat;

3) he/she

must satisfy

the court

performed

adequately

in

organization that

the process

of

(according to due process procedures) so
of embarrassing-outside scrutiny.

negotiating

he/she has
the plea

as to preclude any sort

AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE;

THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE

JONATHAN D. CASPER
1972

In the introduction
examining the criminal
the defendant because

justice process

the

administration

Casper states that he

is

from the perspective

of

a defendant is perhaps

"consumer" of criminal

defendant who must

of his book,

justice.

Casper argues that

most directly live
of

criminal

but also

to society

justice.

at large.

examine what the defendant thinks is

of his behavior,

with

criminal

operation

and the

justice

and impact

Hence, it

of

Casper

is

of
the

argues that

to

happening to him, the roots

importance

one set

the

is of concern not only

lessons he learns

is of

it is

with the consequences

defendant's past and future behavior that
to him

the most important

of

from his

in

encounter

understanding the

institutions of

American

government.

In conducting his

research, Casper interviewed

defendants who were

interviewed for

hour and

All men

a half.

felonies in Connecticut.
in

Connecticut

twenty-two,
dismissals

randomly.

men on

been charged

an
with

Forty-nine of the men were incarcerated

were

or acquittals.

The

periods averaging about

interviewed had

Correctional

sixteen

seventy-one

Institutions;

on probation,
The

men

the street were

10

and

of
six

in prison

the

remaining

had received
were

a self-selected

selected

sample.

The

interviews were

Since

the

sample

tape
of

generalizing from

recorded

men

came

and

transcribed

from

only

one

verbatim.

jurisdiction,

this group to all of American criminal justice

can be very risky, according to Casper.
In

another section of

defendants are human

is

argues that though

beings, they are not treated as

majority of defendants

American life.

the book, Casper

are treated as

such.

if they are outsiders

The
in

In fact, the application of the criminal sanction

perhaps the

most

serious and

destructive measure

government can take against a citizen.

that the

In Casper's opinion, the

character of the administration of justice is a crucial indicator
of the "justness" of the government and of the quality of life in
a society regulated by law.

Casper

argues

that

"assembly line" fashion.
which

begins

(Casper, 1972,

with raw

defendant's

also treated

In his words, "The
material

pg. 2).

are

Further, Casper argues

that defendants

a series of

preliminary hearing,

bargaining

about

a

system is a machine
those arrested"

The convicted criminal is

sentenced to prison or released on probation.

the

an

consisting of

are processed and emerge as a product.

disposition there are

in

points on the assembly

the stay

"deal", the

Between arrest and

in jail awaiting

cop-out,

and

line x

trial, the

sentencing day.

Casper further argues that the machine has some quality controls,
and

some

assembly

of
line

the objects
at

various

witnesses do not show

are

"rejected"

stages,

as

and

thrown off

charges

up, and imperfections in the

11

are

the

dropped,

state's case

emerge.

Hence, the reality of the system varies from perspective

to perspective.

In

one of

year old man

the interviews

Casper talked to

convicted of manslaughter.

defendant discusses

the process

In the interview,

the

encountered from

the

which he

point of arrest to the point of his sentencing.
prior record and had

a thirty-three

This man had

one year of college education.

typical of most defendants which were interviewed.

stated, like most other defendants,

seen

Further,

as

adversaries in

according

to

a

other

He was not

The defendant

that he felt that the police

were just doing their job when they arrested him.
also

no

game

of

The police are

cops and

interviews,

criminals.

police are

seen

as

performing the valued task of providing order and protecting life
and property.
arrested,

he

When the defendant convicted of
felt

very nervous

and

manslaughter was

uncomfortable

because he

thought that the police were going to

harass and hurt him.

his

coverage

expectations

defendant

was

(based

on

media

surprised that

the

From

episodes),

arresting officers

the

were not

physically brutal to him while arresting him
After

confessed
Mirandized.

arrest,

everything

the

that

Though the

lawyer, he felt,

defendant

he

had

stated

done,

defendant knew

in a sense, responsible

When he finally received

that

he

even

12

willingly

after

was entitled

for what he had

a public defender, he had

several recorded statements about

he

being
to a

done.

already made

the facts of the crime.

When

put in jail,

the defendant

describes the unsatisfactory

living

conditions in the jail.

The

defendant

convicted

relationship with his
been

in

jail two

of

public defender.

and

one-half

someone who was to represent his
worked on

his case, the

making processes which
met with the

manslaughter

describes

He states

months before
case.

that he

he

finally got

concerned his life.

of any decision

The public defender

months after being

assigned to

case and once more before the preliminary hearing.

The

charges went from

first to

enter a

second degree murder

that of manslaughter without the defendant's knowledge.
the defendant wanted to

the

The defendant

and his defender met the day before the defendant was to

plea.

had

When the public defender

defendant was left out

defendant two

his

to

In fact,

discuss the issue of going to trial with

his public defender, but the public

defender never took the time

to meet with his client to discuss the issue.

In another area of

the book, Casper argues that

the placing

of charges

episodes in

the defendant's

Immediately

after

defendants

the

not charged

against a

journey through

filing
with

defendant are

of

arrest and

but the

the legal

charges,

bond

capital crimes.

is

If a

first
system.

set

for

defendant

cannot post bond, he remains incarcerated until the end of trial,
sentencing,
of the

or upon release.

conditions which

demeaning than those

While in jail, defendants complain

are substantially

afforded to convicted

13

more unpleasant

criminals.

After

and

a

preliminary hearing, most

defendants' cases

are disposed of

by

the entering of a guilty plea.

In Casper's
system

of

view, most defendants avoid the backbone of our

justice--the trial.

reduces the significance

system putatively

In

of the

offers to

fact, the

of trials

procedural guarantees that

defendants.

In particular

this may mean that people who are not "legally"

guilt cannot be

lack

proven given the constraints

are in fact convicted with their

and with plea

innocent but guilty.
innocence

and

imposed on police,

own tacit or explicit consent.

bargaining, the defendant
Defendants feel

since doing

cases,

guilty, ie whose

With the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof
state,

our

so

on the

is not presumed

that they must prove their

may seem

difficult,

they would

rather just plead guilty instead of going through the trial.
According to Casper, after the
arraigned,
crucial

and bond

activity

bargaining.
There are

has

of

defendant has been arrested,

been set,

the

the

criminal

justice

In fact, plea bargaining
at least two, perhaps

each side exploits its resources.

defendant

as

for the

system:

plea

three, "sides" of

case depends largely upon the

a privately retained

set

is, in many ways, a game.

opponents) and each possesses resources
of any

stage is

and goals.

the game (or

The

vigor and skill with which

In general, if a defendant has

attorney, the attorney is perceived

being on

his

outcome

side.

If a

public

by the

defender

is

involved, the public defender is viewed by the defendant as being
a member of the prosecutor's team.

14

In reality, defendants view the

criminal justice process as

being a game; a game that they, as defendants, cannot "win."
some

extent, the

defendant's ability

prosecutor's willingness to
of

the cards

viewed as

in the

bargain.

The prosecutor

plea bargaining game.

having the power

defendant's

to play depends

perspective,

to determine
a

The

upon the
holds most

prosecutor is

the sentence.

prosecutor's

To

goal

is

convictions and turn cases over as quickly as possible.

From a
to

get

In fact,

from a defendant's point of view, "money talks" and any defendant
with

sufficient

trouble.
still

resources can

buy his

way

out of

almost any

Though many defendants do not have many resources, they

have

the ability

Casper, demanding a
threat and

a

to

demand

trial.

trial is really a

bargaining

counter,

But,

according to

bluffer's gamei

but

most

cases

it

is a

would

not

actually go to trial.

According to Casper, the
nature

of

a

system which

peculiar and somewhat hypocritical
is

based

upon

the presumption

innocence, due process values, and the criminal trial,

in practice is a game
is known

of plea bargaining, is reinforced

as the cop-out ceremony.

plead guilty, he appears before a

After a defendant

in fact guilty,

plead, and

about his

him by his

attorney.

that defendants are

but which

by what
agrees to

judge to enter his plea.

defendant is asked questions about whether
because he is

of

The

he is pleading guilty

about coercion or inducements

satisfaction with
The questions are
not pleading guilty

15

to

representation afforded
designed to make
to things they did

sure
not

do.
a

Thus, a defendant must appear
ritual.

The

judge

asks

before a judge and go through

the defendants

defendant responds with lies;

questions

the judge knows they are

and the
lies and

accepts the defendant's answer as true.

In concluding his book, Casper discussed an area in which he
interviewed defendants to find

they violated.

With the

out how they felt about

exception of

a few

the laws

arrested on

drug

charges, all the defendants believed that they had done something
"wrong."

Defendants felt that the law they

a norm that was
followed.

against
such

worthy of respect and that such law

Without

exception, all

taking property

behavior

punishment.
criminal

from others

should not

be

defendants

ought to be

felt

that laws

were "good" laws

tolerated but,

in

and that

fact, merited

The men interviewed "accepted" the norms implicit in

law.

But

they have

important, the interviews
that

violated represented

law-abiding

morality, or

not

"internalized" them.

suggest that most

behavior

is the

internalization of the

product

of the men
not

More

believe

of convention,

norm itself, but

rather of

external forces imposing constraints upon a person.

Reading and analyzing

Casper's book, gives a

good insight

as to how defendants feel about the criminal justice system.

general,
potential

the

book

described

defendant

excellent examples

to

the

final

of how cases

plea bargaining or trial.

process

from

disposition.

arrest
The

are disposed of

book

In

of

a

gave

either through

The book discusses the points of view

of defendants, public defenders, prosecutors,

16

the police and the

judge.

The book gives a detailed

the criminal justice system.

17

portrayal of the operations of

A

NOTE ON PLEA BARGAINING AND CASE PRESSURE
MILTON

HEUMANN

1975

According to Heumann, plea bargaining

process by which
trial in exchange
pervasiveness of
roughly only

can be defined as the

the defendant relinquishes
for a

reduction in charge/or

plea bargaining is

10% of

his right to go

all criminal

sentence.

suggested by the

cases go

to
The

fact that

to trial.

In

his

article, Heumann discusses an issue that plea bargaining and case
pressure "go together."
Much

of

the

informed

thought

and

literature

on

plea

bargaining assumes (or at least conveys the impression) that plea
bargaining

can be

understood

as a function of case pressure.

many sources.

best

(though

not

necessarily

exclusively)

This idea comes from

For instance, in reviewing the literature:

"only the guilty plea system has enabled the courts to
process their caseloads
with
seriously inadequate
resources.
Growing concessions
to guilty
plea
defendants
have almost
matched
the
growing need
to
avoid burdensome business of trying cases" (Alschuler,
1968) and,

"So
long
as it remains impossible for our criminal
system
to permit every defendant to claim his right to
a jury trial, some
inducements for the surrender of
that right will be necessary (Yale Law Journal, 1972).
Hence,

"Realizing the need to relieve their congested dockets,
the courts have resorted to various methods to expedite

the
legal process.
In fact, plea bargaining is not
designed to
accelerate
the trial level
but instead
eliminate it (Duquesne Law Review, 1971).
18

According
to
Blumberg,
"...the
emergence
of
bureaucratic
due
process--a
nonadversary
system
of
justice by negotiation...consists of
secret bargaining
sessions,
employing subtle,
bureaucratically-ordained
modes of coercion and influence to dispose of onerously
large
caseloads
in
an
efficacious-rational
manner"
(Blumberg, 1967).
Heumann

argues that comments like

purported case

these are illustrative of the

pressure-plea bargaining linkage, but,

he states

that there is no evidence known to support this assumption.
In conducting

his own

study to

analyze whether

or not

a

linkage between plea bargaining and case pressure occurs, Heumann
reviewed published

reports from

also

interviews with

conducted 71

defenders and
states

the State

judges,

private criminal attorneys.

that it

is at

of Connecticut.

least eight

times

He

prosecutors, public

In his

findings, he

more likely

that the

defendant will choose to plead guilty in lieu of trial.

However,

the relative infrequency of trials compared to alternate modes of

disposition is

trial,

as

not a

far back

recent phenomenon.

as 1880,

did not

It

appears that

serve as

the

a particularly

frequent source of case dispositions.

In concluding his article, Heumann states that guilty pleas,
and to a

lesser extent nolo

contendere pleas, have always

been

the best traveled routes to case dispositions.

Though indicating

that some of the steps followed in negotiating

dispositions have

changed, the core

with the

attorney in

notion of

arranging a deal

return for a guilty plea was

practice of criminal law.

Heumann
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state's

always central to the

states that; 1) between 80 to

90% of the defendants in the superior court are factually guilty,

2) of these, a sizeable percentage have no substantial grounds to

contest the state's case, that is, they are factually and legally

guilty,

3) if the

rewarded in

defendant pleads guilty,

terms

of a

Thus, Heumann argues

reduction

in charge

that there are

he is

likely to be

and/or

sentence.

other issues in which

plea

bargaining arises rather than just case pressure.

Heumann's article

seems to agree

research (Newman and Blumberg).
research, in a

with two other

pieces of

These classic pieces, like other

sense, state that

plea bargaining is

a type

of

assembly line justice which is performed in a bureaucratic style.
According

to

these authors,

which occurs between

plea

bargaining is

a prosecutor and

without the defendant's knowledge.
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a negotiation

defense attorney with

or

JUSTICE BY CONSENTi

PLEA BARGAINING IH THE

AMERICAN COURTHOUSE

ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD R. CRESSEY
1976

Rosett and Cressey's JUSTICE BY CONSENT

the criminal justice system at

work.

introduction

of

to

the

possible remedies
come to the

context

to help

The book provides

plea

control the

bargaining

a solid

as well

overload of cases

American courthouses daily.

and Cressey argue that

is a description of

In their book,

though plea bargaining can be

which
Rosett

defined or

viewed in various ways, it is basically the process by which

defendant in a criminal

case relinquishes his right to

exchange for a reduction in charge and/or sentence.
Rosett

and

Cressey

courthouse that the

plea

bargaining

"trial court"

occurs

so

as

the

trial in

According to
often

should be viewed

as a

in the
"plea

bargaining court". One interesting issue was brought out in their
book.

Since

most citizens

plea bargaining occurs
have

had some

experience with

perhaps from appearing in court in
The authors argue that
it is easier

the guilty

citizens feel that for a

than pleading not guilty because

courthouses
plea,

response to a traffic ticket.

to plead guilty, pay

will be necessary.

so much in our

traffic ticket,

the fine, and go

home rather

another visit to the courthouse

Plea bargaining,

therefore, occurs even

the lowest level of the criminal justice system.
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at

Rosett and Cressey state that

plea bargaining occurs almost

instantly when a case is brought to court.
limited number of

ending result of

cases are

For instance,

chosen for trial

severe punishment.

Rosett

only a

and they have

and Cressey

an

state

that out of every one hundred adults arrested for felony charges,
fewer than three are sent to
or

even

decided, but

prison.

are settled

Thus, cases are not
by

compromise.

tried

Hence, the

criminal justice system, dominated by discretionary decisions, is

designed primarily to convince defendants to plead guilty.
Rosett and Cressey discussed the term "justice" in a section

of their book.

Though they agreed that defining justice is very

difficult, nevertheless, justice is done when like situations are
treated alike.

Each individual

is to be

rules, regardless of who they are.
also done by giving

subjected to

On the other hand, justice is

each person what he/she deserves,

the punishment fit the

general

crime and the criminal.

by making

However, Rosett

and Cressey also argue that a system of criminal justice that did
not take into

account people's uniqueness and

be so unmerciful

and wasteful of

personality would

human lives that few

thinking

citizens would support it.

Rosett and Cressey argue that justice
the

cheap.

Tactical

Prosecutors and

agree

upon

accused.
willing

considerations

defense lawyers

sentences

at

strike any

appear

dismiss or

times

without

Attorneys rarely expect to try
to

seems to be bought on

bargain that
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to

dominate.

reduce charges

ever

consulting

and

the

a case and they appear

will

allow them

to avoid

trial.
there

In

fact, the core of

seems

to

prosecutor,

be

something

defense

counsel,

administrators--except

According

to

Rosett

disturbing about a

of cases

plea bargaining criticism is

the

and

in it

for

everyone--defendant,

courts,

jails,

the

the

police.

and

Cressey,

there is

something

personal interest

deeply

which the outcome

and convenience

of

In fact, it is deeply disturbing

unrelated to

the crime committed

defendant's correctional

needs.

justice

be harsher

system seems to

prison

society,

those at the bargaining tables.
when sentences are

and

victim,

criminal justice system in

depends on

that

In all

or to

reality, the

to the

the

criminal

least powerful--the

poor, the black, and the young.

Rosett and
their book.

courtroom

probation

The

making

the issue

of discretion

authors mentioned that in our

actors

(prosecutors,

officers,

especially with
the actors

Cressey introduced

etc.)

defense

have a

great

cases which involve

are given ultimate

reliable

predictions,

resources and due process

crimes brought to

court.

most criminal cases.
courtroom actors

the disposition of

courthouses, the

attorneys,

amount

judges,

of discretion

plea bargaining.

In fact,

discretion, no factual

basis for

a

command

to do

"justice"

demands that limit the capacity

trial about the facts of a crime

in

and

for a

to less than 15% of the serious

Thus, negotiated

results dispose

In fact, as the volume of cases

develop their own

grows, the

intimacy and habits.

criminal cases becomes a

of

Thus,

bureaucratic ritual

performed by professionals who feel that society has delegated to

23

them a hopeless task.

In conclusion, the disposition of criminal

charges by agreement between prosecutor and the accused sometimes
loosely

called

"plea

bargaining" is

considered

component of the administration of justice.
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an

essential

UNDERSTANDING THE SHORT HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
JOHN H. LANGBEIN
1979

As late as the eighteenth century, ordinary jury trials
at

common

law

were a

judge-dominated,

conducted so rapidly that plea
rise of adversary

variety

caseloads

began to

law of evidence made

a routine to dispose

of factors advanced

procedure

bargaining was unnecessary.

procedures and the

trials unworkable as

lawyer-free

of so many cases.

the common law

increase and

thus, plea

The
jury
A

procedures in which

bargaining was

in

demand.

Langbein's article

discusses five

areas which

he used

describe plea bargaining«
1.

Plea bargaining is a nontrial mode of procedure.

2.

This nontrial procedure subverts the design of our
Constitution which provides that "in all criminal
procedures, the
accused shall enjoy the right to
...trial... by an impartial jury".

3.

...We
make it costly for an
accused to claim his
Constitutional
right because
right now when
an
accused

is convicted following

punish
him twices
"enjoying his right
deterrent

effect to

once
to a

a jury

for the
trial".

dissuade

him

trial, we

crime and
for
We
rely on a
to claim

his

right to trial.

4.

With plea bargaining, the accused cannot present
defenses and have guilt proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.

5.

Plea
bargaining has
won the
Supreme
Court because
it

endorsement of
the
is
an "essential

component of the administration of justice.
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to

In his article, Langbein discusses how jury trials were used
in the middle

of the eighteenth century.

For instance, no voir

dire process was used, and between twelve and twenty felony cases
were tried per day.

When jurors were chosen, they usually sat in

on and heard cases for a

number of days.

They also heard

a few

cases at a time before making a decision as to the outcome of the
particular cases.

It is important to note that
expedited jury trials
later took time
them

sit

on

defendants

entirely

was the want

of counsel.

the

jury.

Another

exercising

in

a way

important

their

that

encouraged the

that the presentation

trial.

the time-consuming

Further,

nonexistent and in

the

law

was

accused

that
self

to rely

A fourth area which was
the cross-

in a businesslike fashion

stiffness of

common

of

a modern

adversary

evidence was

virtually

the eighteenth century,

process in criminal cases.
which were

counsel

against

of evidence and

examination of witnesses was performed
but lacked

issue

"privilege

upon the pressure of counsel.

discussed was

Hence,

to interview prospective jurors prior to letting

were

incrimination"

the most important factor that

there was no

appeal

Hence, all these rights or privileges

not ordinarily observed by defendants was taking much

of court time and thus, was clogging up the system.

Historically, defendants were
rights

of

however,

a jury
the

trial.

When

authorities would

elect jury trial

coerced into exercising their
jury trials
cease

and instead, by

26

were transformed,

coercing the

accused to

more polite means, they

would

coerce him to

waive his

were getting what is
plea

jury trial rights.

known as a

Hence,

"bench trial".

bargaining was the result of the

jury process.
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In

defendants

conclusion,

reduction of the trial by

PLEA BARGAINING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAM
1979

Friedman's article
as far

back as 1880.

explored the history
He

discussed a

County, California from 1880

to 1970.

argues that plea bargaining does not

of

can be

"abolished".

study examining

In his

article, Friedman

Friedman argues that the

those who doubt that

He states

Alameda

stand by itself; it is part

a process which is by no means new.

historical record supports

of plea bargaining

that the

plea bargaining

problems of

criminal

justice have deep roots, and reform will be difficult and slow.
Friedman states that

the plea bargaining

does not serve as a deterrent to crime.

case,

offenders were

process certainly

For instance, in a cited

eagerly pleading guilty

to the

charge of

"stealing from a person" in order to avoid the charge of robbery,
which

carried

example where

a heavier
the

penalty.

Friedman

district attorney

plead guilty to lesser offenses.

cited a

encouraged

New York

defendants

to

Such "under the table" bargains

were the result of the district attorney not having time to worry

about petty crimes such as assault

when there were murder crimes

to be solved.

In his article, Friedman argued,
defense

attorney persuaded

like Blumberg (1966), that

their clients to

most cases studied in Alameda

plead guilty.

In

County, California, many offenders
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changed their not

guilty pleas

to that of

guilty because

they

were either persuaded by their attorneys, were promised a lighter
sentence for a lesser

charge, or out of remorse,

self-hate etc.

(which was rare).

In his

distinct

article, Friedman

periods.

In

Friedman found that
jury,

others

claimed

divided his

the first

their "reward".

and

worthwhile to plead

and fewer

cases were

1880,

others pled

second period,

about the 1950s, the guilty plea was
really

beginning

took a chance

still

In the

three

period

many defendants

pled guilty;

study between

on trial
guilty

before.

by
and

lasting until

much more dominant.

guilty as trials

dismissed then

in

It was

became less common
In this

period,

Friedman found that the defendant had less chance of acquittal if

he went to

trial.

probation.

In the third period, after the 1950s, defendants most

always pled guilty.

Hence, pleading

guilty was the only

road to

In this current period, defendants relied on

negotiations between attorneys more than

anything.

trial by jury option had decreased to a very

In fact, the

small percentage as

did the percentage of acquittals.

In many instances, the trial by jury option was rarely used.
Now, the

majority of trials are cut

trials being conducted.

and dry with brief informal

In conclusion, where trial by juries was

considered a norm between 1880-1950, society no longer feels that

jury trials are the normal way of dealing with those accused of a
crime.
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COMMENTS OM THE HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
LYNN

M. MATHER
1979

Mather

argues

understanding
conditions in

explored.

of

that

if

any

contemporary

which the plea

It is the author's

material

plea

is

to

bargaining,

bargaining practice began

pretrial

screening

Now,

before

our

then

the

must be

opinion that plea bargaining began

based on two changes in the substance of the criminal
the mid-nineteenth century.

aid

law during

when cases undergo

they

reach

the

court,

extensive

there

are

relatively few genuine disputes over guilt or innocence.

According to Mather,

criminal law

in the early

nineteenth

century was based on the penology of Beccaria, Bentham, and other
utilitarian philosophers.

Because the primary goal of punishment

was deterrence, sentences were to

be determined according to the

offense rather than the offender.

"new

penology"

individualized

had

emerged,

sanctions

rehabilitate) the offender.

based

on
to

philosophy
reform

of

sought

In an

effort to make the punishment

{later

new procedures were introduced,

"determinate" sentences, prison

juvenile courts, different penalties

classification systems,

for youthful offenders, and

presentence investigations (Vasoli, 1965).

also developed

a

a

that

fit the individual, a variety of
such as

By the end of the century,

during this period.
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Parole and probation

In fact,

probation evolved

from the common law

formal

practice of suspending sentence into

program involving

reports to the court.

probation

Between

officers

who made

a more

written

1903 and 1923, California's Penal

Code Section 1203 was amended eight

times to refine probation as

an alternative in sentencing.

Plea

bargaining

punishment.

It was

facilitated

the

individualization

a way for judges and prosecutors

to reach a

sentence that, in their

view, would be more appropriate

needs of the individual

offender.

extent

substantive

pressures

justice

of

influence.

in

for the

An important question

to which plea compromises

of

is the

actually reflect a concern for

the

individual

case rather

than

administrative

expediency

or

political

According

to

sometimes be achieved best

Moley

simply

though, "

real

the

justice

by compromising a case out

can

of court"

(Moley, 1929).

The

second

bargaining
Alschuler

was

change which

the

discusses

Mather

tremendous
this

growth

factor

feels helps

of

the

primarily

promote plea

criminal

in

terms

law.

of

the

administrative problems which face the courts as they try to cope
with the

Mather,

increased caseloads

not only

they were also

were the

of a

(Alschuler, 1968).

cases appearing in

According

to

greater numbers,

distinctly different type.

In fact,

the

offenses most frequently compromised included issuing bad checks,

forgery, auto theft, larceny,
law violations, and

nonsupport, statutory rape, liquor

motor vehicle offenses.

For some of

these

crimes, there was difficulty obtaining convictions and in others,
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civil

remedies had been secured.

restitution for bad

their families,
Hence,

there

For instance, defendants made

checks, returned

or married

was

no

stolen cars, provided

the underaged

girl (Miller,

serious

infractions

of

the

the author

states that

many cases

for

1927).

law

being

committed.

In conclusion,
being

are now

plea bargained because prosecutors feel that cases "do not

warrant felony treatment."

Further, it is

the author's opinion

that the problem of criminal law

administrators is that they are

not only supposed

and settle disputes, they

also

to keep order

dramatize the moral

values of

the community

must

and perhaps,

that is why plea compromises are seen as unacceptable because law
administrators tarnish the ideal of law enforcement.
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PLEA BARGAININGS

THE

MARK

19TH CENTURY CONTEXT

H. HALLER
1979

According

to

Haller,

plea

bargaining

apparently

arose

independently in a number of criminal courts in the 19th century.
These

simultaneous

number of

developments

broad structural

Criminal Justice at the

were presumably

changes that

time.

related

to a

characterized American

In his article,

Haller discusses

ways in which such developments may have provided the context for
the institutionalization of plea

bargaining as a method of

case

disposition.

Both Alschuler and

probably

nonexistent

Friedman agree that plea

before 1800,

early or mid-nineteenth century,

began

to appear

during the

and became institutionalized as

a standard feature of American urban

third of the 19th century.

bargaining was

criminal courts in the last

In fact, during the twentieth century

there may have been periods of renewed growth of plea bargaining:
in the 1920s, especially

in the federal courts faced

numbers of prohibition cases,

with large

and in the 1930s, perhaps

related

to the growth of street crime.

In

developed

his

article,

relatively

Haller

states

independently

that if

in

jurisdiction at approximately the same
most likely related

to broad structural
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a

plea

number

bargaining

of

local

time, the development was
changes in the role

of

the courts.

For instance, one factor shaping the criminal courts

in the nineteenth century was that the courts lost their dominant

position in

criminal justice.

That

is,

through the

colonial

period, the courts

generally controlled their caseloads

they issued arrest

warrants on complaint of

By the 1840s
created

and 1850s, however, modern

to

exercise

departments

patrol and

also apprehended

aggrieved citizens.

police departments were

detective

functions.

criminals.

prosecutorial

staffs

developed

and

decisions, at

least in serious cases.

because

Further,

often

Police

full

handled

time

charging

As a result, the control

that courts exercised over caseloads declined.

Another change

development

of

disposition.

which Haller mentioned in his article is the

imprisonment

In the

as

a

standard

19th century, the rise

form

of

case

of state and

local

prisons, combined with penal codes prescribing incarceration as a
standard
element

penalty for
in

a

variety

sentencing.

designed to repair

imprisonment

were

of

Hence, no

the damage to

penalties

to

crimes, introduced
longer

was

the

a

sentence

the victim; instead, fines

deter

or

new

rehabilitate

or

the

offender.

An important issue which is mentioned in Haller's article is
that the criminal justice system was not perceived by experienced
criminals

system for

as

a place

for legal

bargaining and

adjudication

manipulation.

but rather

For instance,

as a

Haller

discusses instances in which police departments recruited men who

had no formal schooling beyond

the age of 13 or 14.
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Further, in

the lower

courts, the

justices were

nonlawyers and

defendants

usually appeared in court without legal representation.

Further,

legal attorneys usually had low social status which, in a
forced

them to bargain

hence,

the

criminal

to any extent
justice

to get

system

lack of legal orientation was another
which

plea bargaining

justice system

place

for

developed.

legal

adjudication

bargaining and manipulation.

by

actors

Thus, the relative

part of the context within

As

was not perceived

what they wanted.

was dominated

neither trained nor oriented toward legality.

sense,

a

result, the

criminal

by experienced criminals

but

Plea

rather

as

a

system

as a

for

bargaining, thus, arose at

a

time when the actors in the system perceived the criminal justice

process as an arena for deals and favors.
In conclusion, it is reasonable to
types of

plea bargaining

Century.

One

stemmed

generally

poor,

may have
from

sometimes

underrepresented by an

the

expect that at least two

coexisted in
fact

that

foreign-born,

attorney.

the late

19th

defendants

were

and

frequently

Another types, stemming

from

the political or corrupt nature of criminal justice would reflect

an agreement in which the exercise

of political influence or the

use of bribery would be part of the deal.
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PLEA BAR6AIMIMG AND ITS HISTORY
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER
1979

Alschuler's

article explores changes

in

guilty plea

practices and in attitudes toward the guilty plea from the Middle
Ages to the present.

For most of the history

of the common law,

Anglo-American courts did not encourage guilty pleas but actively

discouraged

them.

In

fact,

significant practice only

generally

met

practice

with

plea

bargaining

after the American

strong disapproval.

nevertheless

became

a

as

Civil War, and

The

dominant

emerged

a

it

plea bargaining

method of

resolving

criminal cases at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of

the

twentieth century.

To

begin

with,

Alschuler defines

exchange of official concessions for
The concessions
offense

given a

charged, or

a

plea

concessions may proceed from any

as an

the act of self-conviction.

defendant may
variety of

bargaining

relate to

other

sentence, the

circumstances.

Such

of a number of officials.

benefit offered by the defendant,

however, is always the

The

same-

entry of a plea of guilty.

During most of the history of our legal system, guilty pleas
were more
article

discouraged than
that

significant
commission

the

welcomed.

practice

of

plea

attention

and

criticism

studies in

the

1920s.
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Alschuler

as
In

states in

bargaining
a

result

his article,

his

attracted
of

crime

Alschuler

mentioned four specific

indications of plea bargaining

the

The first indication

American Civil War.

Langbein's

study in

which he

extremely rapid in an
counsel.

prior to

was that of John H.

discovered that jury

era when neither party was

trials were

represented by

During this era, an informally selected jury might hear

several cases before retiring, and the law of evidence was almost
entirely undeveloped.

During this time, Langbein found a

number

of cases in which the court urged defendants to stand trial after
they had attempted initially to plead guilty.

A second indication
War

emerged

from J.S.

of plea bargaining

Cockburn's examination

5,000 indictments between 1558-1625.

been

the indictments

altered:

charges, etc.
altered

burglary

Civil

of approximately

During the first 30

of this period, confessions of guilt

some cases,

prior to the

years

were virtually unknown.

to which

defendants confessed

charges had

been

reduced to

In

had

larceny

During the final 35 years of Cockburn's study, the

indictments

disappeared

and

the

defendants

entered

confessions in only 15 to 20% of the cases heard.
In a case conducted by David

H. Flaherty (1749), there were

three defendants who pled guilty to theft from a brigantine after

the Attorney General announced

for the burglary charged in the

that he would not prosecute

indictment.

them

Flaherty found that

during this time guilty pleas were uncommon for crimes tried and,
even if a

defendant had signed

examination,

that

a confession upon a

confessions were

defendant sought trial by jury.
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usually

preliminary

rescinded

and the

A

fourth

study

conducted

by

Charles

Cottu

defendant who was charged with forging bank notes.
two indictments were prepared, one for

possessing forged

notes with

a

In this case,

forgery and the other for

the intentions

of uttering

For the first indictment, punishment was death.
the defendant pled guilty

involved

them.

In this case, if

to the second indictment, he

would be

convicted for a lesser offense upon his confession.

Alschuler stated that in order for plea bargaining to occur,

such pleading

must be conducted

In fact, the formal
is

at

least

as

strictly on a

requirement that a guilty plea

old

as

exclusively to criminal

the first

should

confessions

not be

be voluntary

treatise

devoted

pleas of the

Crown 1

arising from "fear, menace, or

recorded.

(extrajudicial,

nolo contenderes, and

English

law fStaundforde's

which declared that a guilty plea
duress"

voluntary basis.

Further,

confessions

guilty plea

the four

during

types of

interrogation,

confessions) must also

occur

on a voluntary basis.

In concluding his article, Alschuler states that the growing
complexity

of the criminal trial

contributed to

the development of

was not the

only factor that

contemporary plea bargaining.

Urbanization, increased crime rates, expansion of the substantive
criminal

law,

and

bureaucratization
have

also

concerned.

played
For a

the

professionalization

of police,

prosecution and

crucial

parts

where

variety

of reasons,

plea

and

defense functions
bargaining

Alschuler

society has come a long way from the time when guilty
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increasing

is

argues that

pleas were

discouraged
justice."

and

litigation

Further, society

first appellate decision on
refused to

permit

the right

was

thought

has also come

"the safest
a long way

test

from the

plea bargaining, in which the
to trial

deceit or device."
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to be

of

court

defeated "by

any

PLEA BARGAINING:

A CRITICS REJOINDER

KENNETH KIPNIS
1979

Kipnis' paper is
reformed
Brunk.

system of
In

a reply or critique to two
plea bargaining:

his paper, Kipnis

twofold conflict with

democratic idea of

deserts

it violates

system:

and Conrad

bargaining is a

the constitutive purposes of

a criminal justice

and

liberties is the

Thomas Church

argues that plea

not conducive to the punishment of
their

defenders of a

the liberal-

the practice

is

the guilty in accordance with
basic

liberties.

Among such

right against self-incrimination and

the right

to the lowest reasonable sentence.

Kipnis critiques Thomas Church and
which

they

both

practiced, is

argue

that

improper.

rebut

bargaining.
what

they

plea

needed

reforms.

take

to

be

the

main

give varying
the system

arguments

lay to rest the most

In his article, Kipnis

that jury

and Brunk

presently

In their papers, their general thrust is to

bargaining and

very important to

as

they are both reformers of

abolitionists in order to

about

bargaining,

Though Church

views of plea bargaining,

of plea

plea

Conrad Brunk's papers in

begin

of

plea bargaining.

instituting the

feels is

Kipnis

disposition of criminal
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the

important doubts

discusses an area which he

the issue of

trials remove the

the task

of

argues

cases from

the

control

argues that

of

bureaucrats and

"trials are costly and

Kipnis argues
citizens may

that jury

of

of

many

purposes for

responsibilities.

justice,

it

would

(2)

which

Kipnis argues

(1) stability} it immunizes the

the responsibility

miscarriages

Where Church

psychologically unpleasant,"

trials serve

hold great

jury trials have t
much

professionals.

state against

otherwise bear

security:

that

they

for

the

incorporate

protection against official abuse of the criminal justice system,
(3) openness;

by opening

up through

citizen involvement,

the

jury trial reduces the cynicism and contempt bred by less visible

proceedings, (4)

democracy}

check against dated

law and

(5) participation:

the jury

trial builds

a kind

overzealous officials and

jury trials offer

of

finally,

an opportunity for persons

to assume an important responsibility as citizens in a democracy.

Hence,

Kipnis is

in

favor of

abolishing

the plea

bargaining

system.

In his

article, Kipnis argues

that our system

of criminal

justice can be best understood as an institutionalization
principles.
guilty

The first is that

of serious

specified

administered punishment

fact, justice in
receives

However, under the
accused

who

"theoretically

those individuals who are clearly
wrongdoing deserve

proportional to

punishment is realized

neither

are

more

nor less

their

correct"

by

sentences,
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the

officially

when the guilty

punishment

juries

an

wrongdoing.

than

reforms advocated by Church
tried

of two

In

person

is deserved.

and Brunk, those

would
sentence

be

guaranteed
deserved

by

persons

who

According
bargains

have

done

to Church and
would

have

that

with

which

Brunk, those

these sentences

Kipnis argues that this systematic
this structural injustice,

they

are

charged.

taking advantage
discounted

in

of plea
some way.

misapplication of punishment,

is what discredits the

legitimacy of

plea bargaining.

The second principle which Kipnis introduces in his paper is

that certain

basic liberties shall

the guilty to justice.
of checks

against

runs

The second principle underlies the system

and balances.

This

self-incrimination.

bargaining and its
the

risk

punishment

by pleading

that plea bargaining

argues

that

the

guilty.

if

he

right

under

discounted sentences, the

increased

incriminate himself

principle addresses

Kipnis

system of

of

not be violated' in bringing

plea

accused

refuses

Hence, Kipnis

violates a constitutional right

to

argues

secured by

the plain language of the Fifth Amendment.
In

concluding his

article,

correct, then even the reformed

Kipnis argues

that

if he

is

plea bargaining system advocated

by Church and Brunk violates an inalienable right.

Kipnis argues

that if bargained for sentences are reasonable sentences, then in
order

for the

bargain

sentence must be lower

after

conviction

bargaining are thus
right that

at

to

be

attractive,

bargained

than the sentence that could

trial.

Hence,

being permitted or

they should

the

not be

defendants

be expected

under

plea

encouraged to give up

permitted to
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for

alienate.

a

Kipnis

feels that defendants should be entitled to both a fair trial and

the lowest reasonable sentence upon conviction.
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FROM PLEA NEGOTIATION TO COERCIVE JUSTICE:

NOTES ON

THE RESPECIFICATION OF A CONCEPT
WILLIAM F. MCDONALD
1979

The purpose

of McDonald's paper

conceptualization
bargaining"
concept of

or

of

state's

phenomena

"plea negotiation."

plea bargaining should

pleas or bargains.
the

the

is to provide
referred

an adequate

to

as

McDonald argues

not be

"plea

that the

restricted to

either

In his opinion, the fundamental phenomenon is

use of

coercion to

obtain

the legal

grounds for

imposing a penalty.

In his article,
tell

that in their

McDonald states that some
jurisdictions no "plea

but readily

admit that

Even judges

deny that

courts.

"plea

(In other

many cases

any "plea

plea bargaining's functional
right according to McDonald:
pleading guilty

bargaining" goes on,

are "settled"

before trial.

negotiations" go

countries, many

bargain" as we do in

prosecutors will

conclude that

on in
they do

their
not

America, but however, many engage in
equivalent).

All these

people are

there is nothing negotiable

about

in those courts.

Instead, defendants are simply

informed that they have a choice:

they can either "plead guilty"

and get mercy or go to trial and face the consequences.

Further,

defendants who do not challenge the prosecution's case can expect

greater leniency than those who deny their guilt.
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In his

article, McDonald

between explicit

and implicit

negotiations, the defendant
for

some

specified

uses Newman's (1966)
plea negotiations.

agrees to

concession

negotiations, there is

by

will be punished more severely for

vary

along

three

other

permitted, and
the

earmarks

who negotiates.
of

a

legal

explicit

plead guilty in

exchange

state.

In

implicit

but defendants learn

going to trial.

important

agreement is treated as a legal

In

the

no bargaining

distinction

they

Negotiations

dimensions t

whether

the

contract, the amount of haggling
Explicit bargains have

contract,

and

defendant with some procedural protection

thus,

some of

provides

the

when the "contract" is

broken.

McDonald

discusses

Georgetown Institute of
that

most

involve

judges)

who generally

survey

of

Criminal Law

negotiations

usually

binding.

a

defense

were

treated

the

by

and Procedure which

fairly

counsel

plea bargaining

explicit,

and

the

found

Negotiations

prosecutors

agreement as

(and

often

contractually

The survey conducted by Georgetown defined a negotiated

plea or plea bargain as "a

defendant's agreement to plead guilty

to a criminal charge with the reasonable expectation of receiving
some

consideration

from

the state."

Hence,

involves reasonable expectations on the part

plea bargaining

of the defendant as

to a more lenient sentence if the defendant pleads guilty.

In

concluding

his

article,

McDonald

fundamental evil

of plea bargaining is the

of

power.

its coercive

McDonald argues
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feels

that

the

state's improper use
that the

distinction

between the compulsion to plead guilty and the compulsion to turn
state's evidence

or

render other

essential evil

involved.

are also evil.

In his

the

its

state use

Hence,

the state's

rather

than

the

Convictions obtained

not alter

the

through coercion

concluding remarks McDonald states, "Does

power to

grounds for imposing

services does

penalize

in order

a penalty or obtaining
use of coercive

"plea

bargaining"

process.
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obtain the

a special service?"

power should
or

to

be questioned

"negotiated

justice"

PLEA CONTRACTS IN WEST GERMANY
WILLIAM F. FELSTINER
1979

Felstiner's paper describes

plea bargaining.
of

penal

The paper explores

orders have

allegedly

the West German version

inherent

avoided

in

plea

of the

the degree to which the use

some of

the

bargaining

negative practices

in the

United

States

namely, overcharging defendants, penalizing defendants who insist
!!

on

going

to:trial,

and

manipulating

jail

time

to

persuade

defendants to| plead guilty.

In West Germany, cases are concluded

by the use

which are

of penal orders

written proposals by

the

|
i

state

to

a defendant

stipulating the

crime committed

and the

penalty to be levied if the defendant does not object.

II
In

his

I paper, Felstiner

discusses

in great

detail penal

!i
li

orders.

He states that penal orders are prepared by a prosecutor

and signed

by a judge.

The penal order describes

the wrongful

ij

behavior of the defendant and the

and indicates

the applicable

evidence gathered by the state

provisions of

The penal order then specifies the

the criminal

punishment to be imposed upon

the defendant and if the defendant does not object in

in person within

one week, the

imprisonment may

writing or

order becomes effective and

the same status as a conviction after

no

code.

be imposed,

driver's licenses.
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trial.

only fines

has

With penal orders,

and suspension

of

Penal orders may
the

American

criminal

be used only

equivalent

intent or

of

for crimes called
is

misdemeanors

involving

criminal negligence

and felonies

concerned

with protecting property.

which

Through the use of penal

of criminal cases were disposed of in the 1960s.

many

motor

vehicles

decriminalized,

Verqehen,

and

penal

administrative

orders still

In 1976, though

law

disposed

orders, 70%

violations
of nearly

were

70% of

cases.

It is important

penal orders,

to mention that though

their

roles

American prosecutors.

by

the

German

judge not
trial

is

are quite

For

prosecutors prepare

different

from

that

instance, a West German trial

by the

prosecutors and

prepared

by

police

is run

defense counsel.

officers

who

of

A

conduct

evidentiary hearings, interview victims/witnesses and defendants.

The

police

conduct their

facts of

a

case.

accused,

then

investigatory

the

If

own

there

police

information

investigations to
is enough

turn over
to the

evidence

all

their

prosecutors

determine the
against

the

evidence

and

who then

file a

penal order with the courts.

In

concluding

Germany penal

his

paper,

Felstiner

argues that

a

West

order is equivalent to plea bargaining an American

traffic ticket.

Felstiner had proposed

that the American courts

adopt a penal order system but, that system, or a system like it,
is

already

bargaining.

being

used

in

America--that

system

being

plea

Though the functions of a judge, prosecutor, and the
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police vary from West Germany to

the United States, the disposal

of criminal cases remains, in a sense, the same.
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PLEADING GUILTY IN LOWER COURTS
MALCOLM M. FEELEY
1979

Feeley's paper examines
petty offenses in

the practice of pleading

lower courts and

standing assumptions about

guilty to

questions some of the

the plea bargaining process.

long
In his

paper, Feeley argues that though plea bargaining of the classical
type rarely

bargaining

occurs,

continue

Feeley states

the

term itself

to

serve

that the

and

important

simple logic

certain

aspects

symbolic

of plea

of

functions.

bargaining is

so

compelling that it is now often taken for granted.

Feeley
bargaining,

argues
the

that

in

defendant

reduction of charge

the

conventional

extracts

view

concessions;

or sentence recommendation, in

pleading guilty.

This view is based on the

defendant will go

to trial.

plead guilty.

reasons.

plea

either

the

exchange for

assumption that the

However, many defendants in

criminal courts never seriously contemplate trial,

do

of

Further, defendants plead

lower

although they

guilty for various

For instance, people may plead guilty for the mere fact

that private attorneys may charge $200 or more per day to conduct
a trial, yet few fines exceed $50.

of

the

possible

costs to

the

Hence, prosecutors are aware

defendant

and

they know

defendants threats to go to trial are rarely carried out.
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that

In his article, Feeley compares

to that of a supermarket.

He states that the reality of American

lower courts is akin to supermarkets
commodities

advance.

have

been

clearly

Arriving at

explicit

bargaining

process
In a

in which prices for various

established

an exchange

acceptable agreement.

the plea bargaining process

in

designed

to

reach

supermarket, as in

"bargain" to get them reduced.

labelled

this context

customers (or defendants) complain about

a supermarket, prices or

and

in

is not
a

an

mutually

a lower

court,

prices, but they rarely

In a lower court setting, like in

punishments are fixed as compared

to a

higher court level.

In his article, Feeley states that
the classical plea bargaining

many of the trappings of

process still exist and

serve important symbolic functions.

that they

For instance, the trappings

furnish the illusion of a "deal" and allow

an attorney to muster

tangible evidence of the value of his service to allay the doubts
of an

often skeptical client.

defendant attempts
sentence in

to secure a

In

a classic plea

reduced charge

exchange for his guilty

though, both

types

However, the

"deals" which are made in

in fact "deals"

of concessions

plea.

but are the "going

occur

In

bargain, the

or a

guaranteed

the lower courts

on a

regular

basis.

the lower courts are not

rate" for certain

crimes as

compared to felony level courts.

In

concluding

generalize
criminal

about
cases in

his article,

plea

Feeley

bargaining

mind, usually
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have

states that

only

felony rather

a

those who

small
than the

set of
petty

offenses.

Hence, Feeley

inferences

and

bargaining.
has

almost

tries to

overgeneralizations

Feeley states that
become synonymous

caution against
about the

the process of

with

cautions against this.
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unwarranted

notion

of

plea

pleading guilty

plea bargaining

and Feeley

PLEA BARGAINING AND PLEA NEGOTIATION IN ENGLAND
JOHN BALDWIN
MICHAEL McCONVILLE
1979

Plea bargaining is
justice system.
it is

in the

beginning to
denied

Though it is not
United States,

emerge.

and/or

bargaining

a fact of

thrives

by

in

a

criminal

practiced on the same scale as

its true dimensions

Although

opposed

life in the English

are only

the plea bargaining
English

climate

Appellate

now

practice is
courts,

actually determined

by

plea

the

principles and procedures approved by the Court of Appeal itself.
In both England and

cases will

the United States, a great

be settled

example, about 85

by a

plea of

that

percent).

the proportion

Since

importance of the
American

In England,

percent of defendants charged

criminal offenses plead guilty.

seem

guilty.

plea

bargaining

researchers

to

pleas

is even

occurs

considerable

it would

higher (90

quite

has been recognized

devote

for

with indictable

In the United States,

of guilty

guilty plea

majority of

often,

the

and has

led

attention

to

examining the factors that cause defendants to plead guilty.
I

The

American

evidence

majority of guilty pleas
court bargaining.
have

clearly demonstrates

that

a large

are the result of some kind

of out-of

By comparison though, researchers

in England

displayed little

interest in guilty

have been reluctant to acknowledge
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pleas and

the courts

that a plea of guilty can

be

anything other than a
defendant.

full, free, and voluntary decision

by the

More specifically though, the idea of plea bargaining

has traditionally been regarded as repugnant to the English legal

system.

In fact in England, it is believed that such bargains or

pressures do not exist.

It is interesting to note a comparison between United States

and

England

prosecutor

HcConville's article.

roles

as

mentioned

For instance,

prosecutor wields considerable power?
to

proceed

with

a

prosecution;

In England, on

Baldwin

in the United

he

may

agree

and

States, the

he decides whether

particular charge; and he can recommend a

the court.

in

to

or not

reduce

particular sentence to

the other hand, criminal prosecutions

are not usually conducted by professional prosecutors at all.

the English courts, prosecutions are

does

not

have an

unsupervised

charges

and a

specific sentence

counsel

would be quite unethical.

In

conducted by barristers who

act both as prosecutors and defense lawyers in
barrister

a

various cases.

power

A

to manipulate

recommendation by

prosecuting

Hence, it is the trial judge

who has power to make decisions.

In conclusion, no matter who

power in either
Baldwin

and HcConville,

pleading
clear

the United

has the final decision

States or in

defendants are

England, according
still

guilty for numerous considerations.

that

there

is

no

highly

making

organized

to

"pressured" into

Though it is quite
"system"

of

plea

bargaining in England, many defendants seem to have been involved
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in a process that resembles plea bargaining more closely than has
been appreciated.
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AN EXPERIENCE IN JUSTICE WITHOUT PLEA NEGOTIATION
SAM

W. CALLAN
1979

Sam Callan's

bargaining on

article

the part

discusses an experiment

discusses a

of judges

dissatisfaction of

and the

conducted in El

public.

The author

Paso County, Texas,

which plea bargaining was abolished between 1975 to 1978.

article, Callan found

bargaining"

and

it necessary to distinguish

"plea

negotiation."

inducement

to

plead

negotiated

or

fixed, constitutes

bargaining.

He

guilty,

feels that a plea

judge

is a just

will see to it

between "plea

argues

expressed

in

In his

that

or

any

implied,

odious practice

of plea

of guilty is produced

implied threat that, if the defendant

prosecutor believes

He

whether

the

plea

by the

refuses to accept what the

sentence, the prosecutor

that the defendant

and the

gets an unjustly harsh

sentence.

The El Paso

purposes was

system which

due to

a reaction

four aspects of plea bargaining.

was established for

experimental

to public dissatisfaction
Such

with

dissatisfaction was based

ont (1) plea bargaining inevitably produces the ridiculous result
that, as crime

grows worse, sentencing becomes more lenient.

crime grows worse,
increases, hence,
plea negotiation is

law; (3) plea

the number

of cases on

prosecutors need
the focal

the criminal

to offer

point of public

docket

better deals;

{2)

distrust of

the

negotiation produces unequal justice
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As

and, (4) the

law

says

that judges

are

to

impose sentence

negotiations, prosecutors assess

sentence.

but

under plea

Though there is

so

much public dissatisfaction with plea bargaining, the only factor
that justifies plea negotiations is economic expediency.

The experiment

conducted in

abolishing plea negotiations.
difficult

to generalize

El Paso,

Though

Texas, consisted

the statistics used

from due to

the population

of
were

of 400,000

nevertheless, the crime rate and statistics used were not too far
from the national average.

the

purpose

criminal"

In

of sentencing

to

rather than "the

argues that

"imposing

whatever general

his experiment, Callan adopted as

be:

"let

the control

fit the

punishment fit

the crime."

Callan

adequate

control

deterrence can be

incidentally

produces

achieved through punishment.

Further, by control, Callan means controlling the number of cases
in

which

probation

is offered

as

opposed

to incapacitation.

Hence, Callan introduces a point system to be adopted.
With Callan's

important

when

point system, various factors

determining

imprisonment, or the
the

defendant

considered.

has

whether

to

length of sentences
a

prior record,

grant

probation,

to be considered.

probation

is

(1)

it focuses the

judges mind on

proper to sentencing; (2) it commits the
he will

consider, thus

allowing observers

special treatment of a criminal

principle

equal justice;

(3)

57

it

down into
the factors

judge in advance to the

publicize any
of

If

usually not

The purpose of the point system is broken

four elementst

factors

are considered

to see

and

that violates the

allows the

defendant

to

predict

what

the judges

sentence

is

apt to

be?

contains the express promise that the defendant
plea

if

the

sentence.

judge believes

he

should

(4) it

can withdraw his

impose

It is important to mention that

and

a more

severe

the point system does

not control the sentence, each case is evaluated on an individual
basis.

By adopting a system as that in El Paso, Texas, cases in the
docket

will

reduced,

move more

unequal

rapidly,

justice will

the

be

diminished, and

decision will be much more respected.
Callan states that

the El

that "El

do without

Paso can

public distrust

will

be

the judge's

In concluding his article,

Paso experiment has

failed to

plea negotiations."

prove

Though

the

Callan argues that

his

experiment has created

a docket crises,

system is a worthwhile

system which should work in any area with

minor improvements.

He argues that finding worthwhile judges who

will

the case

help to

move

docket

importance if the system is to work.
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more rapidly

is

of great

IN DEFENSE OF "BARGAIN JUSTICE"
THOMAS W. CHURCH. JR.
1979

According

to

Church,

the

strongest

critics

of

plea

bargaining argue that the practice should be abolished because it
coerces defendants to give up their right to trial and because it
results

in

irrational sentences

for

criminal defendants.

In

fact, there are two separate arguments to support the recommended
abolition of plea
fairness

for

bargaining.

individual

The

first focuses on

defendants.

The

second

geared towards societal interest of rational
For

instance, plea

jurisdictions, is
judges to
sole

bargaining

said

to

make dispositional

ground

of

harried

concessions to

administrative

argument is

criminal sentences.

particularly in

encourage

procedural

expediency.

pressured urban

prosecutors

and

defendants on

the

In

the

author's

opinion though, reforming rather than eliminating plea bargaining
should be of greater importance.

According to Church,

if plea

eliminated and operated in a

bargaining cannot readily

tolerable or even desirable

be

manner

in many jurisdictions, than a careful examination of abolitionist

arguments is

surely in

bargain justice

order.

does not

In fact,

appear to suffer

irrationality and unfairness attributable to
As a matter of

fact, according to Chief

case of Santobello v. N.Y. (404

U.S.
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according to
from the

Church,

systematic

it by many critics.

Justice Burger, in

257-260. 1971);

the

"Plea bargaining...is an essential component of the
administration of
justice. Properly administered, it
is encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected
to

a

full-scale

trial,

the

states

would

have

to

multiply the number of judges and court facilities."

In his article, Church discusses the issue of defendants who

are

factually

versus legally

factually innocent defendant
guilty if

he knows that

acquittal are slim.
he and/or his

innocent.

his chances of a

An innocent

on the

On the

one who has

illegally obtained

willing to plead

defendant would plead guilty if
the defendant would be

found

evidence held by

other hand, a legally innocent

the

defendant is

evidence used against

Further, a legally innocent

for some reason or

the

harsh sentence and/or

circumstances or

prosecutor.

court of law.

argues that

at times would be

counselor feel that

guilty depending

He

him in

a

defendant is one who

another cannot be tried possibly, due to some

weakness in the case (acquittals).
In the author's opinion, the case against bargain justice is
typically based

upon the

widespread view

that plea

bargaining

results in excessive and undeserved leniency in the sentencing of
admitted criminals.

According to Church, "Since

the prosecutor

must give up something in return for the defendant's agreement to
plead guilty,

the frequent

defendants are not dealt

the

case."

Thus,

plea

result of

this problem

bargaining

can be solved

differential between plea

bargaining is

with as severely as might

reduces the deterrent impact of the

that

plea

results

law.

that

otherwise be

in leniency

that

However, Church argues

by eliminating

the sentencing

and trial convictions.

But, like the
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due

process

critique

of

plea

bargaining,

however.

Church's

argument ignores the uncertainty and risk of trial.

Church argues that plea
or prosecutor manipulate

bargaining, particularly when judge

post-trial sentences to "punish"

those

who refuse to plead guilty can also operate to coerce or unfairly
encourage

guilty

pleas.

Further,

Church states

that bargain

justice in a court whose resources are inadequate to its caseload

may very well result

in excessively lenient sentences.

Church's opinion, it is
plea negotiation

quite possible to construct a

that is

at least

as defensible

But, in
system of

as the

trial

introduces

four

process upon which it is based.

In

concluding

theoretical

decided on the

First, those

information
available

are

and

to

the

focus

evidence

equally

to

most defendants who

negotiations.
on

predicted

bearing

should possess or have

on
and

reform of

to trial must

be represented

Third,
trial

if

plea

outcome,

that outcome
defense.

may be unable to

unfair treatment.

be

defendant for not

should
The

plea bargaining system may be

do go to trial

thus, maybe getting

case to trial.

operation or

cases that go

prosecution

requirement for a defensible

costs,

the

Second, every defendant should

throughout

negotiations

Church

merits, without penalizing the

pleading guilty.
counsel

article,

assumptions concerning

plea bargaining.

by

his

all

be

final
that

absorb the

Hence, each side

access to sufficient resources to

take a

Church's concluding remarks are that a system of
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negotiated justice can be as defensible
which the negotiations are based.
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as the trial system upon

PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT

CONFERENCE;
PLEA

EVALUATION OF

A REFORM IM

BARGAINING

ANNE M. HEINZ
WAYNE

A. KERSTETTER

1979

Plea bargaining which is the primary mode of criminal charge
disposition has been

under sustained attack

for some time.

fact, the U.S.

National Advisory Commission on

Standards

Goals

and

abolished.

urged

But, despite

that

indications that the practice

criticism
who

from many,

assert his

persons may plead guilty to avoid

not been abolished,

there

be

are few
The major

is penalizes the defendant

constitutional right

National Advisory Commission, 1973).

follow conviction at trial.

should

is about to disappear.

of plea bargaining is that

wishes to

Criminal Justice

such negotiations

criticism

In

to

trial (U.S.

As a consequences, innocent

the more severe sanctions that

Though plea bargaining cannot or has

many changes are currently

being introduced

to help eliminate the backlogging of courts.

In 1974, Norval
more active role
defendants should

Morris proposed that

in plea negotiations
also be invited

this proposal, Heinz and Kerstetter

judges should play

and that the victims

to participate.

To

a

and

fulfill

conducted a field experiment

design in which they randomly chose 1074 cases, 378 were assigned

63

to

use a pretrial settlement

conference; the remainder were the

control group.

use

The field experiment in Dade

County, Florida, evaluated the

of

conference

a

pretrial

settlement

restructuring plea negotiations.

All

as

a

means

of

negotiations took place in

front of a judge, victim, defendant, and arresting police officer
who were invited to attend.

In

order to

minimize

administrative

occur,

Heinz and

passed

the arraignment state.

invited

Kerstetter

by the prosector

used only

problems

cases that

the

case.

compensated.
not to

The

but to

to attend the

conference unless their

charge was
it

clear

victims

were

was a crucial element

neither

be

represented by

subpoenaed

counsel, or

conference, thus cancelling it.

the judge would
that, for

had already

nor

The defendant could decide to attend with counsel,

attend

confirm the

may

Victims and police officers were

eyewitness identification of the defendant
in

which

indicate the

to be assumed.
that

the

to

At the conference,

purpose of the

purposes of discussion,

fail

meeting and

the defendant's guilt

state
of the

Such assumption was necessary to make

defendant

was

not

admitting

guilt

by

participating in the discussion.

Prior to the implementation of the conference procedure, the
average

time from arraignment

conference procedure reduced
three weeks.

126 days; the

the time of disposition

But, the actual

significantly altered by the

to disposition was

to roughly

negotiation process had not

use of the conference.
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been

Hence, the

greatest impact of

the conference procedure

was to shorten

the

length of time it took to close cases.
It

would

be

difficult

experiment would be
problem.
amount of

a feasible solution

It seems

as yet

another

time that

a case

takes to

justice system.
amount of

to ascertain

whether

a case,

a

bargaining

alternative to

reduce the

get through

the criminal

help reduce the

change such as

seem to improve the plea bargaining--court process.
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this

to the plea

However, if such a change would

time to settle

or not

this would

ALASKA'S BAN OF PLEA BARGAINING
MICHAEL L. RUBINSTEIN
TERESA J. WHITE
1979

Plea bargaining was banned by Alaska's Attorney General
in

August

of

instructions

1975.

The

forbidding

assistants from

Attorney

all

district

engaging in plea

misdemeanor prosecutions

filed

explicit

practice

sentence

as

plea bargaining was a fully

attorneys

of August

15,

written
and

their

felony and
1975.

The

policy in a jurisdiction

bargaining

of criminal law.

issued

bargaining for all

Attorney General announced this new

which

General

had

In fact,

been central

prior to August

in

to

the

15, 1975,

institutionalized reality in Alaska;

a reality that had gained total judicial acceptance.
The Attorney

General's purpose

"return the sentencing

was

which

function back to

to "clean up the least

The Attorney General

they did

defense

the judges."

lawyers and

line fashion.

work much harder

feel a

policy was
His

to

goal

just aspect of the criminal system."

nor defense lawyers liked the new
to have to

his new

wanted to eliminate the former practices in

district attorneys,

cases, in an assembly

of

sense of

Neither district

relief to
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settled

attorneys

policy because they were going

in preparing

business.

judges

for more trials,

be out

of the

but

sentencing

In order

to

find

out if

the

Attorney

General's

policy

improved the quality of justice, Rubinstein and White conducted a
longitudinal
1978).

study which

During their

three

major

cities

period of two

years (1975

research, 400 interviews were

conducted in

of

covered a

Alaska.

Further,

3,586

involving about 2,300 defendants were also analyzed.

case

files

These cases

came tot he court prior to the ban and served as comparison cases

during

the study.

The

statistical objective

variables associated with any

charge

rejection,

of

what

experienced criminal

The
was

In fact,

involved

of a variety of outcomes

(such as

conviction, probation,

statistical evidence showed that
once

the

dominant

attorneys declined

recommendations occurred

cases.

discover

dismissal, acquittal,

and sentence length).
frequency

was to

in only

practice

drastically«

4 to 12

percent of

where charge bargaining occurs now,

dropping

one

or

more

counts

from

the

among
sentence

convicted

it usually

multiple-count

indictments.

When the

plea

Attorney General

first advanced

bargaining, panic spread through

his decision

the Alaska court system,

there was concern that without plea bargaining,

have to go to trial.
docket

was

occurred,

Though

interesting was

none

of

that

complaint to final trial court outcome).
was found that

the plea

predictions

a dramatic

the date of filing a

In analyzing the data,

bargaining ban
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these

there was

decrease in disposition time (measured from

it

many cases would

In fact, a massive slowdown in the criminal

anticipated.

what was

to

did not

cause this

decline.

In fact, the

court administrators have been preparing

for the worst and changed their calendar

procedures to eliminate

most all types of delay.

One

important

sentencing

change

practices.

severe

but,

impact

sentences.

attributable

the new

to

which

occurred

In fact,

sentencing

plea bargaining

The

increase of

a demand

to

was the

"get

impact

became

policy

much more

was not

sentences
tough" on

of

found to

was said
violent

to be
crimes.

However, the only real increase which occurred was for defendants
with first-time felony

first-time

felony

convictions.

convictions

Hence, the

were

no

defendants with

longer

given

merely

probation.

In concluding the article, Rubinstein

though

the ban

on plea

responsibility on

bargaining

judges, the ban

and White argued that

has placed

more decisional

has been unable

to eliminate

badly exercised discretion.

For instance, a

defendant's income

still

of

the

Hence,

income

and

affects

indications

the

that

quality

race,

trial.

employment

there

status

are

still

determine the impact of sentencing.

In

evaluating

discusses plea
bargaining

the

article,

bargaining

or reforming

is
it in

most

concerned
some way.

all

with

literature

abolishing

But, like

which

plea

all other

literature, no simple solution to the plea bargaining process can
or

has been found.

plea bargaining

The most

important question in

should be "how will the

plea bargaining?"
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regards to

courts function without

THE SENTENCE BARGAINING OF UPPERWORLD AMD UNDERWORLD
CRIME IN TEN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS

JOHN HAGAN
ILENE NAGEL BERNSTEIN

1979

The

types of
courts.

authors of

this article explore

sentence bargaining

tactics in

Hagan and Bernstein

reactive

prosecutorial

the use

of different

tent federal

district

distinguish between proactive and

functions

and

they

hypothesize

that

proactive prosecution of upperworld crime is associated with more

explicit sentence bargaining than is
underworld

the reactive prosecution of

crimes.

In their

article, Hagan

courts, unlike state

and Bernstein

argue that

courts, have the capacity

federal

and jurisdiction

to prosecute many forms of upperworld crime, although they do not
always exercise
argue

that a

that authority.
prosecutorial

federal district courts

Further,

focus on

Hagan and

Bernstein

upperworld crimes

is associated with

the use of

in the

specific

types of bargaining tactics that involve a strategic and explicit
position of coercive threats and promised concessions.
In their
based on

article,. Hagan

field work

done on

and Bernstein conducted
federal courts

in ten

research
districts.

They considered qualitative data obtained

through site visits to

each

which

of

the

approximately

ten

200

districts

hours

of

during

court
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they

proceedings.

observed

Hagan

and

Bernstein conducted

approximately 600

hours of interviews

with

court personnel involved in decision making functions in criminal
courts.
to

Among those

five

presiding

interviewed were the chief judge
judges,

the

United

States

Attorney,

Assistant United States Attorneys responsible for
the office

dealing with criminal

officer and

other court officials were

There

are

differences

prosecutorial functions.

is

The

subsections of
chief probation

state

and

According to Hagan and

proactive.

and

also interviewed.

between

state system of prosecution is, in
federal system

matters.

and three

federal

Bernstein, the

a sense, reactive whereas the

Hagan and

Bernstein argue

that

state courts are organized almost exclusively to respond to cases

brought to them
other

hand,

by local police.

the

courts

selectively determining the
loads.

As the federal level,

have

much

greater

composition and

on the

potential

for

size of their

case

Despite the fact that federal courts receive the bulk of

their case referrals from federal enforcement agencies (FBI, DEA,

IRS),

they are

not limited to

agency input.

In fact,

at the

federal level, prosecutors prosecute crimes which seem to be rare

so as to limit the crime from growing.
Another difference

way in which

codes

between

j

state and federal courts

each plea bargains.

For instance, state

is the

criminal

include lesser offenses to which charges frequently can be

reduced whereas
according to Hagan

common at

federal criminal codes cannot, j
and Bernstein, charge reduction

the state level

Further,

ils extremely

and relatively infrequent, in federal
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courts.

Hence,

federal criminal

codes less frequently

include

graded offenses.

In concluding

their article, Hagan and

evidence which suggest

Bernstein presented

that proactive prosecution df

upperworld

I

I

crime

leads

to

more

explicit

reactive prosecution of

sentence

underworld crime

bargaining,

involves lless.

and Bernstein argue that since federal crimes have 1ess

or highly visible
it

victims to testify about

is usually necessary to cultivate

evidence from within

must arise

witnesses

sources of information

and

Hence, a favorable

prior to the

willingness to help solve the criminal activity.
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Hagan

the cri minal events;

the criminal operation.

plea bargaining settlement

whereas

defendant's

LEGALITY

AND EQUALITY«

PLEA BARGAINING IN

WHITE-COLLAR

AND COMMON

JACK

THE PROSECUTION OF

CRIMES

KATZ

1979

In

his

article,

Jack

Katz

mentions differences

prosecution of white-collar and common crime in orde r
implications for
bargaining.

equality in

Katz

current proposals

argues that

in the case

to

in

the

draw

out

to reform

plea

bargaining.

of plea

proposals to reform have tacitly been aimed at a subset of crimes
and their corresponding

enforcement roles.

reforms that would make bargaining

consistent

with

legality

discourage lenience

or

in the

According to

Katz,

over formal dispositions more

"due

process" appear

prosecution of

likely

common crimes

to

while

i

leaving largely

unaffected the

low visibility

exercise of

the

power not to prosecute white-collar crime.
According to Katz, one of the most common critidisms of plea

i
bargaining

is

that

charges are

arrest and final disposition,

bargaining takes
that

have

reduced between
j
Further, critics assume that plea

place against

already

been

i

unaccountably

a background

filed.

perspectives appear to apply to

of fonraal

However,

nonei

charges

of

these

plea bargaining in ' cases where
I

there is
readily

no arrest,
identifiable

no alibi
victim.

defense, no
Hence,

"police report,"

understandings (or

bargains) are reached before any charges are filed.
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no
plea

According to

Katz, current

analysis of

proposals for

reform

the problems

by and

large

of plea bargaining

ignore the

prosecution

of

■

white-collar crime.

In his article, Katz discusses the
white-collar crime

and

have

fact that definitions of

been notoriously

unsatisfactory.

He

argues that the term is filled with political overtones--it seems

inevitably

to imply

"unequal treatment."

Various' inconsistent
:

meanings have been advocated thus,
current definitions fall into

failure

to

separate

three categories.

analytically the

position from the criminal behavior.
there are relatively

those in

by

criminals

few crimes that can

corporations, and

The first

social

can

be committed

The

collar" classes (ies a

extortions

under color

Patsy Hearst can commit a

to

define

the category,

than

of

i

common crimes

both "white-collar"

In Katz's opinion though, if the social class of
not sufficient

by

price fixing, | political

third category is that most

by members of

class

be committed only

,

official right).

is a

The second category is that

white-collar occupations {ie:

contributions

i

many of the difficulties with

and "blue

bank robbery).

the criminal is
neither

is

the

structure of criminal behavior.

An important

issue mentioned

by Katz

comparison of white-collar crime to that
in the

purest "white-collar"

position is

used: (1) to

occupational routines so

which is

used as

of common cri me

diffuse criminal intent

is that

so cial

crimes, white-collar

a

class

into ordinary

that it escapes unambiguous

expression
!

of any

specific discrete behavior;
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(2) to accomplish :the crime

I

without incidents or effects that furnish presumptive evidence of
its occurrence

before

the criminal

has been

identified.

The

I

position

is also used (3) to cover

participants through
ignorance.

up the culpable knowledge of

exerted action

Katz argues that

that allows

in order to

each to

claim

convict someone of

a

i

"pure' white-collar crime, prosecutors must
that a crime

has been "disguised"

build a case to show

in each of

three ways.

The

position or scheme was designed so that neither its means nor its

consequences
criminals

would reveal

that

would be able to

a crime

had occurred.

maintain silence or ignorance should

there be an investigation.
In his article,

the prosecution of

Hence,

I

Katz discusses

the social organization

white-collar and common crimes

of

which present

prosecutorial discretion in

two different forms.

First, social

distance between prosecutor

and police produces a

public record

of

law enforcement

decisions

not

to

against

prosecute

common

crimes that

(giving

an

overrepresents

impression

prosecutor is bargaining away legitimate power).

that

the

The exercise of
i

the power not to prosecute

is often invisible to the

in regards to prosecuting white-collar crime.
when

common

crimes are

concerned,

charges, accept pleas, or go to
scrutiny which will,

public eye

On the other hand,

decisions to

file, dismiss

trial will be subject to

more than likely, influence

public

a prosecutor's

decision in regards to the cases.
I

In concluding his article, Katz
frustrates

equal

justice

argues that plea bargaining

especially
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since

the

white-collar

defendant will be

able to retain

more effective counsel.

many substantive irrelevant factors
both categories of crime.

In

But,

influence plea bargaining in

Katz's opinion, if plea bargaining

is objectionable because it permits variation in the availability
and quality

of counsel

that objection is
collar and

to affect

convictions and

equally applicable

common crimes alike.

75

disposition,

to prosecutions of

white-

MANDATORY SENTENCING AND THE ABOLITION OF PLEA
BARGAINING;
THE MICHIGAN FELONY FIREARM
STATUTE

MILTON HEUMANN
COLIN LOFTIN

1979

According
criminal

to

justice

prosecutorial
engage

in

the
system

and

a

authors, two
most

judicial

wide

variety

features

often

the American

criticized are

discretion.
of

of

unbridled

Further,

plea

prosecutors

bargaining

practices

unencumbered by appellate court constraints and similarly, judges
have

a

wide range

of

defendant or charge.

sentencing

In

options for

fact, critics of

indeterminant sentencing are quick to

of the

present system.

argued

that

judicial
pleads.

particular

plea bargaining

and

point out the shortcomings

For instance,

on the

undue

leniency

results

eagerness

to grant

concessions

On

any

from

the other hand, defendants

one hand,

it is

prosecutorial
to the

and

defendant who

who do not plead

or who

are "singled out" by the prosecutor or judge are subject to harsh
treatment.

In their

consequences

article, Haemin

of

abolishing

and Loftin

plea

attempt to

bargaining

along

introduction of mandatory sentencing simultaneously.
Loftin examined

county,

the

Wayne

prosecutor

County in

Detroit,

prohibited his
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Michigan.

subordinates

study the

with

the

Heumann and
In

that

from plea

bargaining in any case in which
warranted

a

mandatory

Michigan's Felony
1977.

The

a recently enacted state statute

sentence

in

regards

to

firearms.

Firearm Statute went into effect on January 1,

statute

mandated

a two-year

prison

sentence

in

addition to the sentence for the primary felony for any defendant
who possesses a firearm while engaging in a felony.

The two year

consecutive sentence cannot be suspended nor can an individual be

paroled

while

serving

time

for

a

firearm

offense.

mandating this two year sentence, the prosecutor of
publicly announced that his

While

Wayne County

office would not engage in

any plea

bargaining in cases in which the Gun Law applied.
To

conduct

impact of the

their study,

new Gun Law

plea bargaining {the

Heumann

simultaneously with the abolition

They

studied a

before and after the Michigan Statute
Loftin limited

Wayne

County.

their study

In their

period of

came into affect.

to only

study,

In addition, crime,
I

were collected for

from

interviews were
and defense

defendant, and disposition data

■

seven categories of offenses

felonious assault, murder,
issue which was

both

Heumann

one jurisdiction

twenty-three

of

related to

six months

conducted with court personnel (judges, prosecutors,

attorneys).

examined the

abolition of plea bargaining as

firearm offenses).

and

and Loftin

(armed robbery,

criminal sexual conduct, etc.).

explored was whether

the Gun Law together

The
with

the Prosecutor's policy have increased the certainty of sentences
delivered by the court

more.

and whether the sentence is five years or

The strongest statement that can be made is that for every
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100 robbery c^ses, an average of

seven defendants who would have

received a two-to five-year sentence prior to the new statute now
receive a sentence of five years or more.

In concluding their

article, Heumann and Loftin

found that

sentence bargaining and sentence adjustment was

still occurring.

For instance, though

bargain with the

the prosecutors could not

two-year sentence of crimes which involved
prosecutors were still
sentence (iei
portion

was

bargaining with the other

assault and
still being

giving the two-year

assault with
bargained).

mandatory sentence

were bargaining or adjusting
to the "going rate"

the use of a firearm,
portion of the

a firearm--the
Hence,

prosecutors were

which was required,

the rest of the sentence

which occurred six

Law Statute.
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assault

but

according

months prior to the

Gun

DOES IT PAY TO PLEA GUILTY?

DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING AND THE

FUNCTIONING OF CRIMINAL COURTS

DAVID BRERETON

JONATHAN D. CASPER

1981

If

there

is any

proposition at

the

heart of

the common

wisdom about criminal courts, it is the assertion that defendants

who plead guilty are likely to
defendants
convicted

has

with

similar

after trial.

traditionally been

bargaining
receive

assembly

receive less harsh sentences than

characteristics and
It is this

seen

The

who

are

sentence differential which

as the

line.

charges

engine

notion

driving the

that

plea-

guilty-pleaders

lighter sentences than similarly situated defendants has

been viewed with increased skepticism in recent research.

In this article, Brereton and Casper presented a case

confirming the existence of
two tasks.

sentence differentials to accomplish

The first is to present evidence for the existence of

differentials in three

court systems they have been studying and

to discuss issues of generalizability from these
courts.

study

The second

is to caution against the

courts to other
recent skepticism

about the existence of such differentials.

After
whether

asking judges,

or not

prosecutors, defense

a differential

courtroom actors strongly feel

this respect it could

attorneys etc.,

sentencing exists,

many of

that it pays to plead guilty.

be argued that court participants
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the

In

tend to

exaggerate the costs of going to trial
sufficient notice of the

defendants with worse

category.

doing

Further, some cases which go to

so

In

fact that the more serious

justifiably

these

have wasted

because

the

they

raise

is unlikely

suffer a penalty

courts

time

the trial

trial are regarded as

important

defendant's guilt is in

cases, it

choose trials will

crimes, and

records are over-represented in

questions, because the
on.

because they fail to take

legal

questions and so

that the

defendants who

for they are considered

(Heumann, 1979).

defendants whose cases are regarded as

By

to

contrast,

"dead bang" are much more

likely to receive a more severe than usual sentence if they go to
trial, either because the

court wants to discourage others

doing the same or because, as

from

some judges and prosecutors claim,

such "frivolity" deserves to be punished for its own sake.

for

Brereton and

Casper's study focuses on disposition patterns

robbery

burglary

and

arrests

in three

large

jurisdictions for the period of 1974 through 1978.
1759

cases from San Bernardino county,

and 2520 from Santa Clara county.

records

from

handled

the

standard

the
case,

original

charge, the

variables

They analyzed

2514 from San Francisco,

They were also able to obtain

the defendant's

demographic

California

type

previous

of

age,

of

attorney who

record,
race,

plus the

sex.

A

straightforward comparison of the disposition patterns in each of

the three jurisdictions
defendants

shows that a higher

went to prison than did those

Brereton and Casper

argue that

who pled guilty.

this type of
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proportion of trial
But,

comparison may

be

quite

misleading

because

those

with

prior

records

often

overrepresented the trial category.
In concluding their article, Brereton
sentence

differentials

characterize

and Casper argue that

most

criminal courts

and

sentence differentials are viewed as one of functional necessity.
Sentence differentials are common because

courtroom

participants

numbers of defendants to

as

the only

plead guilty.

they are considered by

way

to

induce sufficient

Hence, when

guilty plea

rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing.

81

THE STRUCTURE OF DISCOURSE IN MISDEMEANOR
PLEA BARGAINING

DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD

1984

In his article, Maynard examined the ways in which decisions
are a product of direct interaction.

Maynard's article shows how

trial options are devalued by the system of discourse employed in

negotiation.

of

Further, Maynard identified three distinct patterns

negotiation

and

a

mix

of

bargaining

outcomes

that

any

comprehensive theory of case processing will need to address.
In
recorded

his

study,

Maynard examined

plea bargaining

obtained at weekly

sessions.

misdemeanor cases, "bargain,"
to

of

were
during

attorneys assemble to discuss

and present

defendants and

tape-

The tape-recordings

"Pretrial and Settlement" conferences

which defense lawyers and district

negotiations

transcriptions

the results of

the judge.

Maynard's

their
data or

method of study included fifty-two cases which ranged from theft,
drunk driving, battery, drinking

public officers, etc.
were obtained.

In

in public, loitering, resisting

all, nearly ten

Maynard's methodological

hours of

recordings

perspective was that of

conversational analysis.

In his paper,

Maynard treats plea bargaining as a naturally

occurring activity and

patterns.

Maynard

seeks to discover formal

argues that in plea
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decision making

bargaining, participants

have ways of

case

they

exhibiting and responding

are involved

in

should

to positions on how

be handled.

the

According to

Maynard, a decision is reached when the negotiating parties agree

on a single position.

Such position

patterns: 1)one party takes

is achieved by one of three

up a position and the

to it; 2)both parties advance

second agrees

positions but one relinquishes his

position to agree with the other's; and 3)the parties compromise.

Each pattern involves

(A)the presentation of ways

case

considered

which

can

prosecution

and

disposition.
allows

be

defense

When

(B)the

to

as

arrive

an opportunity

option

"opportunities"
at a

mutually

is not taken

of

delaying

the

disposition by "continuing"

the case

or setting

Both dispositions and

to handle the
for

the

acceptable

up, the

system

determination

of

a

it for

trial.

delay are accomplished through the

use of

bargaining sequences.

In concluding his
exerts

a

"pressure" for

independent

of negotiating

Further, Maynard argues
related

article, Maynard

to

exchange

states that the

the

benefits by engaging

here-and-now resolution

parties'

desires and

that this system
approaches to

prosecution and

argues that the

plea

of cases

inclinations.

of negotiation can
bargaining.

defense can and

in plea bargaining.

system

be

Maynard

do trade

However, exchange

real

is

mediated by a discourse system in which routine practices, rather
than rational calculations are the central phenomena.
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DRIVING UNDER THE IHFLUEMCEi
ON

THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM

COURT SENTENCING PRACTICES

RODNEY KINGSNORTH
MICHAEL JUNGSTEN

1988

According
under the

to

the authors,

influence of alcohol

considerable attention

For the

most part,

deterrent value of

the

and/or drugs (DDI)

from social

studies

social problem

scientists in

in this

the criminal

area have

of driving
has received

recent years.

focused on

law, proposals for

the

prevention,

and analyses of social movements that seek to address the problem
through

legislative

reform.

Furthermore,

analysis

of

the

implementation of DUI legislation offers an opportunity to extend
the

rich

criminological

literature

that

addresses

the

modification of legislative reform by "courtroom work-groups."
It is important to note that in 1982, California, along with
26

other states, revised its vehicle

code sections dealing with

the prosecution and sentencing of defendants charged with driving
under

the

influence of

alcohol and/or

drugs.

Some

of these

revisions include an increase in the severity of penalties, while

others sought to increase the certainty of application of the new
penalties by
bargaining

imposing
process and

a number

of

by redefining

blood alcohol concentrations (BAC) and
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constraints upon

the

the relationship

plea

between

criminal liability.

Most

of these changes

followed the recommendations of

the Governor's

Task Force on Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Safety.

The article by Kingsnorth
basic

areas.

The

offenses to that

first area

of reckless

until 1982, plea bargaining
charged

with

DUI could

driving in exchange
the

defendant

and Jungsten is divided into
deals

driving.

The

the offense

for a guilty

plea.

on data from

1981, 13

fine, a

lower

all misdemeanor

resulted in a charge reduction to

between

3,500

DUI cases

offered

probability of

a jail

A recent study by DMV,
suggests that in

DUI arrests

in the

reduced to

state

The authors

reckless

driving

1978-1981.

The

principal

means

by which

the

curtail charge reduction bargaining was

the 0.10 percent

23152(b)).
of

to reckless

reckless driving.

were

that

A defendant

reduced

seven California counties,

percent of

found that

authors state

Such reduction

sentence, and a nonpriorable conviction.
based

bargaining DUI

occurred in two forms.

have

a reduced

with plea

two

driving

"per se"

Such law was
under

the

legislature

sought to

the enactment in 1981 of

law (California Vehicle Code, Section

meant to create a presumption
influence.

evidence of the individuals

However, under

of guilt
said

physical performance can be used

rebut a presumption of being under

BACs in excess of 0.10 percent.
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to

the influence and hampers the

prosecutor's ability to use BAC in conducting a prosecution.
law also caused inappropriate plea

law,

The

bargaining for offenders with

The second area which the authors

bargaining.

This process involved the practice of striking prior

convictions

in

the

that of

defendants guilty

was very common between 1980-1981.

34.6 percent of

the defendants in

convictions and in 86 percent

prior

convictions

restrict

this

struck.

practice,

the

conviction

plea.

This

During this period,

the sample were charged

prior

were

prior

was a

of

return for

was

which

second form

practice

plea bargaining

discussed and

of these cases, one or more

However,

new

with

in

legislature

an

attempt

prohibited

to

the

striking of prior convictions for purposes of sentencing in order

to

avoid

minimum jail

Hence, now

even first

their offenses.

stiffer

terms,

offenders were

Second time

sentences

fines, or

but,

incarceration for almost

third

license restrictions.

receiving

jail time

offenders were receiving

time

offenders

double the time

were

for

slightly

receiving

after the new law

was

enacted.

In concluding
that

though the

their article, Kingsnorth and
new

legislation had

good

Jungsten found

intentions, it

was

grounded with false assumptions about court sentencing practices.
The

BAG law

increase

in

failed

to reduce

conviction rates

problems of court

the amount

that

congestion have not

exacerbated by the new law.
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of

trial rates

was anticipated.

and

Further,

been eased but have

been

DETERMINATES OF CHARGE REDUCTION

AND FINAL DISPOSITION

IN CASES OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY

MALCOLM D. HOLMES

HOWARD

C. DAUDISTEL

RONALD A. FARRELL

1987

According

sociologists

to

the

authors,

have expressed

social status to crime.
on

inequities

sentencing.

concern

half

with the

relatively few

occur

in

This is in fact

criminal cases prosecuted
through guilty pleas

over

a

century,

relationship

of

In fact, despite an extensive literature

differential justice,

whether

for

legal

studies

decisions

a problem because

in the United

to reduce charges.

have examined

that

precede

the majority of

States are disposed
In their article,

of
the

authors examined legal, status, and resource determinants of both

charge reductions

burglary and

and

final

robbery in

dispositions

two United States

in

cases

involving

jurisdictions.

The

purpose of the authors' article is to find out whether minorities
are disadvantaged by discriminatory processing.

According

sought to
alleged

to the

identify the

authors, most

effects that

defendants have on decision

of the legal process.
black, poor,

and male

Such research

studies in

social characteristics

have

of

making at the latter stages
typically addresses whether

defendants receive
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the area

more severe

criminal

sentences.
most

However,

studies

are

according to the

inconclusive.

neglected stage of legal

charge

reductions,

of their

authors

argue

of

that

a

processing involves decisions regarding

nonminority defendants.

analysis

The

especially

which involves charge

authors, the findings

charge

reductions

The authors argue that
reductions do

against

plea bargaining

not support conclusions

research because there

is little

or

to prevent

status influences from informally entering into them in ways that
formally are considered illegitimate.

In

conducting

their

research,

prosecutor's case

files

prosecuted during

the period of

1977,

The

data

for "closed"

vast majority of

was

cases.

were

eliminated

The

cases

January 1976 through

since the

from

were

August of

cases involved arrests for

violations of burglary and robbery statutes.
trial

collected

alleged

Cases that went to

current

research

focuses on

guilty pleas.
The variable categories consist

and

dispositional

included
and

types

attributes

of

prior felony conviction
of

indictments.

race/ethnicity, and

of legal, status, resource,

defendants.

variables were

status

of

resources were construed as representation

and pretrial release.
conviction
severity.

charges,
The

factors

record, number of indictments,

Status

employment

Legal

the

defendants.

age,
Legal

by a private attorney

The dispositional variables were number of
charge

reduction,

jurisdictions

and

analyzed were

Pennsylvania and Pima County, Arizona.
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final

disposition

Delaware

County,

In concluding
effects

of

the

the article,

the findings

status characteristics

of

defendants

operate indirectly

through their

influence on

resources.

instance,

Delaware

unemployed

For

defendants

private counsel;

were

in

less likely

the lack of

suggest that

to

be

which increased the

pretrial detention and a more severe

tend to

access to

County,

legal

black

and

represented by
likelihood of

final disposition.

County, a retention of a private attorney was rare.

the

In Pima

Employed and

older defendants were more likely to obtain bail; a resource that
ultimately advantaged them at
had

some

unexpected

Delaware, blacks
whites.

effects

received

In Pima County,

final disposition.
in

the

Race/ethnicity

two jurisdictions.

greater charge

reductions

than

did

Mexican-origin defendants received more

favorable final dispositions than did their counterparts.

status

In

and race/ethnicity

play a

bargaining.
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very important

role in

Hence,

plea

PRIVATE COUNSEL AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS;
A LOOK AT WEAK CASES.
PRIOR RECORDS. AND LENIENCY IM PLEA BARGAINING
DEAN

J. CHAMPION
1989

According to Champion, in recent years, the criminal justice
literature

has

strengths and
courts.

consisted

of research

which

focuses

upon the

weaknesses of plea bargaining in state and federal

Champion

controversial

argues that though

issue,

percent of all

such

practice

criminal convictions.

plea bargaining is a
accounts

for

over ninety

Further, Champion

that plea bargaining

may involve (1)charge bargaining,

the original charges

are reduced to less

bargaining, in

which many charges are

few; and (3)sentence

are

imposed,

including

argues
in which

serious ones; (2)count

reduced to only

bargaining, in which less

perhaps

very

probation

one or a

severe sentences

or

little

actual

jail/prison time to be served.

The purposes
(1)to

of Champion's

examine a random

kinds of priorities

research

piece are

sample of prosecutors

they assigned in plea

threefold«

and determine the

bargaining to factors

such as prior record, seriousness of the offense, or the strength
of

government

evidence;

(2)to

investigate

socioeconomic; background

of

defendants on

leniency or j harshness

of

terms included

agreements; and

{3)to

see

whether

I
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the

influence

prosecutors and

in

representation

of
the

plea

bargain

by

private

attorney versus a public defender changes

the position of a case

or the nature of plea bargaining terms.

Champion's research
county

prosecutors

in

examined a

random sample

Tennessee,

prosecuted criminal cases

Virginia, and

of city

and

Kentucky

who

during the years 1981-1984.

A random

sample of 260 city and county attorneys and their assistants were
identified and were given questionnaires by local bar association
representatives in 1985.

The final participating

260 was 166.

The

the

prosecutors, the

age

of

questionnaires obtained information concerning
number

of

years

prosecutors and other background information.
also

had

a

sample of the

number of

questions

relating

they had

been

The questionnaire
to

plea bargaining

agreements which were made amongst the prosecutors.
The conclusions or
majority of prosecutors

findings of Champion's work were
indicated that they would

punitive conditions

of plea

bargain

offers when

crimes alleged were

serious offenses (ie. crimes

that a

intensify the
the crime

or

which involved

primary crimes against persons including homicide, forcible rape,
aggravated assault and robbery).
in

this

evidence.

instance

appeared

The least influential variable

to be

the

strength

of government

Importantly, most prosecutor's stressed the importance

of avoiding trials and

working out plea agreements

with various

defendants.

As

to

the second

purpose

socioeconomics of defendants,

of Champion's

research piece-

access to conviction records

considerable information available
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concerning the

made

socioeconomic

and educational background of the defendants.
a

rather

large

number

indigent defendants
even

when

options

of

who do not

various attempts

under

cases

the

law.

It was found that

involved guilty

know or understand

were

made to

Defendants

pleas

their rights

explain

from

from

the various

lower socioeconomic

background tend to plead guilty, take

a light sentence, and such

defendants "lets things go as that."

However, defendants from a

higher socioeconomic status are more informed of their rights and
more

often

take

steps

to

see

that

their

rights

are

well

protected.

In regards to

found that in

the third

those cases

area of Champion's

in which the

drop criminal charges, a majority

by private attorneys.
well

in

bargain

defenders.
privately

when

and

was

to

of defendants were represented

in

they

the punitive
were

nearly as

terms

represented

of plea

by

public

In fact, out of 28,315 cases studied, 17,912 involved
retained

defense counsel

defenders.

Forty-eight percent

counsel were

dropped

involving

prosecution elected

Hence, defendants did not fare

their punishment
agreements

paper, it

public

of

compared with

defenders.

convictions accounted

for 36

and 10,403

involved public

cases defended
on

Plea

percent of

by private

11.3 percent
bargaining

of

cases

leading

private counsel

to

cases

versus 87.7 percent of public defender cases.

In

concluding

interesting

issue

defendants who

come

his

article,

in regards

to

from lower

Champion

the Constitutional

socioeconomic
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brought

up

an

rights of

backgrounds

and

their treatment in the

criminal justice system.

such mistreatment should be viewed as

a

problem

in

the

way

prosecutors

He argues that there
discriminate

defendants in that lower socioeconomic status

more plea bargaining.

Hence, they receive

stiffer sentences, too.
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argues that

a violation of due process

based on unequal representation of the law.
is

He

against

defendants receive

more convictions and

FELONY PLEA BARGAINING AND PROBATION;

A GROWING JUDICIAL AND

PROSECUTORIAL DILEMMA
DEAN

J. CHAMPION
1988

According to Champion,

observed

by the mid-1980s,

ninety percent

been

of all

criminal

convictions were being secured through plea bargaining.

Further,

since

because approximately

a trend had

Brady v. U.S. (1970) there has

the use of plea bargaining

been a general increase in

in the last decade.

issues in regards to plea bargaining are the
felony cases.
a

felony,

the

are

probation

critical

use of probation in

According to Champion, when a person has committed
minimum

conviction is one
there

Hence,

sentence

year in prison.

indications

in lieu of

that

that

can

be

imposed

But, in Champion's

convicted

felons

incarceration to

upon

opinion,

are

receiving

an increasing

degree in

certain jurisdictions.

The purpose of
trends

in the

Champion's article was to

use of

jurisdictions in

felony

probation in

Kentucky, Tennessee,

(1)explore recent
a random

sample of

and Virginia,

(2)compare

plea bargaining convictions with trial convictions concerning the

frequency of use

for the

differences

Champion sent

1985.

of felony probation, and

The

respondents.

between

a survey

final

to 260

sample

A random

the

of

(3)consider the bases

states.

city and

For
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city

research.

county prosecutors

prosecutors

sample of

his

consisted

and county

of

in

166

prosecutors

selected from state directories

local attorneys

in selected

Virginia.

the

For

most

predominantly rural, small

were provided questionnaires

areas of

part,

by

Tennessee, Kentucky,

these

prosecutors

were

southern counties, hence, a

with larger urban jurisdictions could be expected.

and

from

contrast

Participating

prosecutors completed a questionnaire containing items related to
plea

bargaining issues, prosecutorial priorities in such issues,

the frequency of

usage of the

insanity plea in criminal

cases,

and substantial sociocultural data.

A

content

participating
years
of the

analysis

felony

convictions

city/county jurisdictions

1970-1985.

The

proportion of

bargaining

of

and

was

in

the

105

conducted for

the

resulting figures permitted determination
felony convictions

trial.

64

percent of convictions were obtained through plea bargaining.

In

plea bargaining.

were plea

percent of

were

1970,

convictions were obtained

through

During 1974-78, about 75 percent of convictions

bargained.

From 1979

to 1985,

through plea bargaining ranged from
of

in

plea

for instance,

1971-72, about 61

Beginning

obtained through

the convictions were

varying reasons

81 to 89 percent.

obtained through

why plea

the conviction

trial.

rate

The rest

Though there

bargaining was used

rather than

jury trial, for one, Tennessee had enacted into law the number of
inmates that the prisons

could hold, making it a law

inmates that the prisons had no room for.
Tennessee knew the

conditions and

people to prison.
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to release

Hence, prosecutors

consequences of sending

in
more

When a case

significantly

involved trial convictions, probation

less

frequently.

Probation

was also

was used

used less

frequently when similar offenses were compared, when persons with
prior

records

were

compared, and

according to offense seriousness.

greater "penalty" associated
fact,

according

through
lessened

to

trial, his

agreed to plead
Prosecutor's

with taking

or her

an

compared with

that

a case to

individual

chances of

guilty in an

agree

comparisons

were made

Thus, there appeared to

Champion, if

considerably

when

trial.

securing probation
the

a

In

was convicted

chances of

earlier plea bargain

such is

be a

risk

a

were

those who

arrangement.

person incurs

by

exercising fully the right to trial.

In concluding the article, Champion reiterated the fact that
now, more than ever before, cases are being plea bargained rather

than going to trial.

And,

more and more people are being

probation rather than incarceration.
and 1985, the
prosecutors

number of felony
was

seventy-eight

64,372.

percent,

Of
were

given

For instance, between 1970

convictions obtained by the
these

obtained

convictions,
through plea

while the rest resulted from trial verdicts.
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50,498,

166
or

bargaining

"PACKAGE" PLEA BARGAINING AND THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
BRUCE A. GREEN
1989

According

to Green, in

multidefendant criminal

prosecutor sometimes offers

the defendants

cases, the

an "all or

nothing"

deal, providing that one defendant will be treated leniently only
if

all the

known

as

defendants plead

"package" or

upheld

by

courts

Hence,

this

guilty.

This practice

"contingent"

when challenged

article undertakes

on

a

sometimes

plea bargaining,

has been

constitutional

grounds.

detailed examination

of the

ethical problems raised by package plea bargaining.
In a

series of

opinions in

the 1970s,

the United

States

Supreme Court has rejected a variety of constitutional challenges
to

plea bargaining,

bargaining

can

prosecution.

fairly

Thus, it

the accused more

the

same

time

judgment on
bargaining of

finding that,

benefit

both

the

administered, plea

defendant

is permissible for a prosecutor

and

propriety of

Supreme

a

Court

the

to treat

leniently in exchange for a plea of guilty.

though, the

a

properly

At

explicitly withheld

prosecutor's offer

during

plea

adverse or lenient treatment for some person other

than the accused.

While tolerating this

type of plea bargaining,

recognized that such practices place
prosecutors
offers.

to

exercise good

faith

However, the meaning of

courts have

a special responsibility on
in making

contingent plea

prosecutorial good faith is far
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from

certain.

prosecutorial

This

article

good faith

unrelated codefendants.

that

one

when

looks

at

contingent

the

question

plea offers

of

involve

The author argues that there is a danger

defendant may

prosecutors should not

pressure

another to

plead

guilty and

make such plea bargaining offers

for the

purpose of exploiting this responsibility.
Another

area

that the

conserving prosecutorial

The article analyzes
advanced in

article

discusses is

resources by offering

the principal

support of

area of

"package deals."

justification that has

the practice:

that

been

a contingent

bargain is a means of conserving prosecutorial
should not be used

the

plea

resources, but it

to preclude one defendant from

testifying on

another's behalf.

Green also

examines

the meaning

involving related defendants.

improper

to

threaten

absent probable cause.
defendant's

loved

in

cases

In fact. Green argues that

it is

to prosecute
If there

one,

it is

of

the

a prosecutor

defendant's

loved one

is probable cause to charge the
permissible

bargaining leverage over the defendant.

improper for

good faith

to use

to

do

so to

gain

Green argues that it is

an offer

of leniency

to the

defendant's loved one to induce the defendant to plead guilty.

In his article, Green

when contingent plea
states that there

another to

discusses prosecutorial "good

faith"

offers involve unrelated codefendants.

is a

plead guilty.

danger that one

defendant may

Hence, prosecutors

98

He

pressure

should not

make

contingent

plea

offers

for

the

purpose

of

exploiting

this

that courts

have

possibility.

In concluding

rejected
bargaining

a

his article,

number

of

practice.

Green argues

arguments
Further,

and

Green

have

upheld

argues that

this

plea

courts have

hesitated to inquire into the prosecutor's motives for fashioning
a

package plea

bargain.

from charging or

In

However,

threatening to

Green's opinion,

this

prosecution to achieve

a prosecutor

should refrain

charge innocent third

inducement is

not necessary

parties.

for the

its legitimate aims and it encourages the

defendant to waive

his right to trial

that is extraneous

to his actual guilty

the government's case.

99

on the basis of

a factor

and to the strength

of

EFFECTS OF EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE ON PLEA BARGAIN DECISIONS BY
PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

HUNTER A. MCALLISTER

1990

McAllister's article introduces and discusses an

which was conducted to

on plea

bargaining.

attorneys were mailed
three

defense

of

In his experiment,
survey material.

attorneys

California, Alaska,
survey.

tests the effects of

and

and Rhode

three

eyewitness evidence

two hundred

evidence

influenced plea

prosecutors

Island were

decisions by

were

states,
chosen.

not included

(identification and

bargaining

eight-two

For each of 47

The purpose of the survey was to find

eyewitness

experiment

in the

out how two types

nonidentification)

both

prosecutors

and

defense attorneys.

In the article, a hypothetical case
mailed to three
of 47 states.

case in which

involving a robbery was

prosecutors and three defense attorneys

The attorneys were randomly assigned to receive a

an eyewitness claimed:

(a)the defendant was

criminal (identification), (b)the defendant was

(nonidentification), or (c)it

was not

the defendant was the criminal (the
focusing

on

in each

juror

McAllister's research

focused on

100

not the criminal

possible to tell

control group).

understanding

of

the

eyewitness

whether

Rather than
accuracy,

how jurors cognitively

handle

the

eyewitness

crucial

evidence.

issue

eyewitness

in a

case

accuracy

In

involving

itself,

nor

eyewitness accuracy; rather,
testimony

influences

the

McAllister's

an eyewitness

is

it

juror

it is how the
plea

opinion,

the most

is

not the

perception

of

potential eyewitness

bargaining

decisions

made

by

prosecutors and defense attorneys.

The major issue of McAllister's paper is whether prosecutors

and defense attorneys
cognitive
trust

would be vulnerable

biases that
eyewitness

nonidentification

as

both be of value

jurors

are.

to the same types

For example,

jurors often

identification

as

informative

not informative,

even though

in deciding defendant guilt.

of

and

they should

McAllister found

that prosecutors and defense attorneys, like jurors, underutilize
nonidentification

decisions.

testimony

when

That is, if there is no

criminal, then

making

plea

bargaining

positive identification of a

the chances of a plea

bargaining agreement would

be much stronger.

In order

to explore the

impact of eyewitness

testimony on

plea bargaining decisions, prosecutors and defense attorneys were
asked

(a)a

about three

different

juror's, (b)their

area,

it

was

found

influenced by

showed

own, and
that

defendant's guilts

(c)their opponent's.

the

what prosecutors

the reaction of

their own

perceptions of

plea

bargain

and defense

the jury or their opponent

for prosecutors

and
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decisions

were

attorneys estimated
would be rather than

personal opinions of defendant guilt.

that,

In this

Hence, results

defense attorneys,

both own

perceptions and

estimated juror

perceptions were

significantly

affected by the eyewitness manipulation.

In conclusion,
defense

attorneys

McAllister found
showed

the

that both
same

prosecutors and

underutilization

nonidentification information in their plea bargain

shown by

jurors in

their judgments

trying to determine the outcome of

accurate than defense attorneys.
the importance of

of defendant

decisions as

guilt.

When

a case, prosecutors were more

Further, McAllister

the need to conduct more research

so as to be able to explore

of

mentioned

in the area

the impact of eyewitness evidence in

the 90 percent of plea bargaining cases that jurors never saw.
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PLEA AGREEMENTS UNDER

THE FEDERAL SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

DONALD A. PURDY. JR.
JEFFREY LAWRENCE
1990

According to the authors, the
was enacted to correct two major
of

the

criminal justice

committed

the

same

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

flaws in the sentencing process

system.

crimes

First, defendants

were

receiving

widely

who

had

disparate

sentences, depending on the sentencing judge, the district within
which the crime was committed, and a wide variety of factors that
Congress

deemed

sentencing.

no

longer

appropriate

Second, the sentences that

considerations

had been imposed did not

accurately reflect the actual time the offender would serve.

statute

provided

individualized

system to be

that

the then-existing

sentencing would

be

in

system

replaced

promulgated by a sentencing

The

of completely

with a

guideline

commission, created by

the Act.

The purpose of

the commission was

to direct and

federal sentencing

guidelines for federal

the

were to

factors

that

sentences while advancing

be

used

in

offenses to

the statutory goals

of the Act.

initial set of guidelines in

guidelines

on

effect

November

1,

1987.

sentencing guidelines structure the sentencing
trial

judge

and

change

the way
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identify

determining individual

commission completed its

took

establish

The

The

1987; the

federal

discretion of the

practitioners

must

look

at

sentencing

consequences

in

general and

their

plea bargaining

discretion and options in particular.

The

federal

participants in

sentencing

the federal

only the mechanics of

guidelines

require

criminal justice

that

the

system learn

the new sentencing guideline but

not

also the

ways in which the guidelines affect their work, particularly with
respect to their effect on plea bargaining.
will

affect

process,
must be
actual

counsel's

role

beginning with

throughout

pre-indictment

especially cognizant
criminal

significance

conduct

under

guidelines and the
characteristics

of the

and

guideline

the

justice

negotiations.

criminal

history

sentencing.

the defendant

criminal

fact that the

Sentencing Reform

of

Guideline sentencing

defendant's
have

major

fact,

both the

Act provide that

personal

are

In

Counsel

far less

important than

under pre-guideline sentencing.

With

these guidelines,

prosecutors now

have a

relatively

strict national policy governing their plea bargains that require
close adherence to the spirit and letter of the

acceptance

of

plea

sentencing because
guideline range

agreements will
judges and

be

guidelines.

affected

the parties

will use

The

by guideline
applicable

as a basis for evaluating the appropriateness of

the plea agreement in light of
the Act, both parties

the real offense conduct.

are given the right to appeal

sentence for improper guideline application
may appeal departure from the applicable
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Under

a guideline

and the losing party

guideline range.

It is

the presiding judge

who chooses the guideline range for specific

cases.

In

concluding

acceptance

of

a

their

article,

responsibility

the

and

authors

providing

argue

that

substantial

assistance to authorities play crucial parts in final disposition

of

a case.

Hence, counsel

may urge

a reduced sentence

defendant if the defendant meets the two criteria listed.

the Sentencing Reform Act

of 1984 corrects the flaws

inherent in plea bargaining cases.
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for a
Hence,

which were

THE DYNAMICS OF PLEA BARGAINING IN THREE COUNTRIES
MARC G. GERTZ
1990

According to Gertz, plea bargaining is an informal method of
compromise imposed upon the formal judicial process for the

of expediency and efficiency, and

it has become the norm

American criminal justice system.

extent

to which

degree to

which

in the

Gertz's article considers the

plea bargaining

other criminal

sake

in uniquely

court

American

systems will

and the

allow

for

compromise of their formal procedures for the sake of expediency,
efficient, predictability, or

other purposes.

In his

article,

Gertz examines the criminal court process in three countries--the

Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark.
countries are

bargaining,

examined to

in

one

form

determine

or

the extent

another,

takes

to which

place

in

These
plea

these

countries.

With the Federal
of

Republic of Germany, there are four levels

West German courtst

The West German court

of assessors.

In

local,

a courtroom, the presiding judge

studied--Frankfurt,

using

In

the

With

Kassel,

his study,

legality

and national.

mixes professional judges with law

proceedings absolutely.

people.

district, state,

West Germany,
and

Marburg

Gertz found that

principle.
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This

judges

controls the

three cities

totalling
WEst Germany

principle

were

1,550,000
operated

obligates the

police and the prosecutor,
which

there

by law, to prosecute all

is sufficient

evidence

possibility of a conviction.

to reasonable

the existence of

the fact that under the German

procedures that
case without

in practice.

give the prosecutor wide discretion

prosecutors

of

be

suppose to be

better served

restitution, doing
apology.

Code

to handle cases

use, cases are
would

the

process that one

of

Criminal

informally.

to handle a
would expect
For instance,

Procedures

With this

accused paying

services,

or

enables

section in

terminated if the public

by the

community

by

system, there are social official

pursuing the formal

153A

In fact,

plea bargaining is buttressed

under strict observance of the legality principle.
Section

justice the

However, it was also found that the

legality principle is not always utilized
the case for

charges for

interest

charity, making

offering

a

public

Hence, this is a form of plea bargaining.

With the Netherlands, there are 19 criminal district courts.

In each district,

there are police

hears the least serious

of six

months.

courts where a single

cases and can impose a

judge

maximum sentence

Approximately 90 percent of cases are handled in

police courts, the remaining are sent to multiple-judge courts.
The criminal justice

philosophy
ideology,
processing

called

"the

system in

opportunity

the Netherlands espouses

principle."

Under

a

this

the police and prosecutors have wide discretion in the
of

cases to

words, cases may

achieve the

be dropped

if they

"best

result."

do not serve

In other

the ends

of

justice, the needs of the defendant, or the desires of the public
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to

proceed.

The

opportunity

principle is

used in

60

to 70

percent of cases.

In Denmark, the

system begins

districts plus the Faroe Islands.
the most serious in which the

with by the city courts.
will

hear the case.

then

two

courts in

84

Almost all crimes, except for

defendant denies guilty, are dealt

If a defendant pleads guilty, one judge

Further,

law assessors

adjudicating the case.

with the city

will

if a defendant pleads not guilty,
join

the professional

judge

in

The Danish system is a compromise between

a legality principle and opportunity principle.

In

fact,

confessions.
cases.

the

Danish

involves many

bargains

and

In reality, confessions account for almost half of

With

this type

clients to confess.

of system, counsel

Further, in

ability to plea bargain.
notifying

system

usually advises

his

Denmark, police also have

the

Police are permitted wide discretion in

defendants that

if they accept

a certain

deal, they

will get a fine and there would be no need to appear in court.
In concluding his article, Gertz argues that plea bargaining
occurs in one form or

studied.

In fact,

another in the three countries

the procedures

actors in the criminal
amount of discretion in

which

were sued

justice system to exercise a
lieu of traditional legal

courtroom decision making.

Hence, though

names, plea bargaining occurs in other
the Untied States.
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which were

allow key
significant

approaches to

it may be called other

countries and not just in

ROUGH JUSTICE
DAVID

HEILBRONER

1990

Rough Justice
three years as

was written

an assistant DA in

book, the author gave a
Justice

by David

System.

served

Manhattan, New York.

portrayal of the New York

He also discussed

occurred during his

Heilbroner who

service with the

In his

City Criminal

many factual instances which
DA's office.

Towards

the

end, the author gave many suggestions on how to help the criminal
justice system run smoother.
The author divided the book into three parts.

In the

first

part he discussed the Early Case Bureau (ECAB) which was known as
the complaint

room or the

arrival to ECAB,

he discussed

about a dozen police
on the floor.

were

These police

snoring

incident was a

a situation in

loudly

Upon his

which he

noticed

were sleeping

officers were "scattered along

blue whales washed up on
(Heilbroner,

sign of how busy

the majority of

DA's office.

officers in full uniform who

corridor, they looked like
they

heart of the

1990,

the

short," and

pg. 4).

the DA's office was.

This

In fact,

police officers had to wait anywhere form two to
I

four hours prior to

being able to discuss their arrest

with the

assistant DA's. 'in most cases, these officers had already worked
their eight hour shifts.
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While in ECAB, the author describes instances in which he is

interviewing witness, victims, and police officers.
filling out paper work
a man because

reason.

He mentioned

for a lady who was filing charges against

the man kicked her

in the "butt" for

Another case involved a

no apparent

victim who received three knife

wounds from a perpetrator who was trying to steal her purse.

point

is

that after

individual

case, the

charges on each

filling

out

Assistant DA

so much
found it

paperwork

instance, with out more evidence,

the filing DA

any case to

assembly line.

to

discover the

An assembly

that he only
For

"it seemed impossible to

guilt or innocence.

Heilbroner began

file

word to go by.

any judicious decision about
would not see

for each

difficult to

and every case because he realized

had the arresting officer's and the victim's

The

ECAB

The

make

fact that

the end. Assistant

operated like

line meaning that

a

the DA's

DA

legal

office

moved cases in bulk, saving a close look at the facts for another

prosecutor on another day who took the case to court.

The filing

DA copied complaints out of the ECAB manual, copied the names and
telephone numbers of
write

up

sheets and

barely more
case.

than a

police officers and witnesses into grids on
compressed the
sketch for

on paper, copy a

of each

the prosecutor

"The routine was simple:

of the case

facts

crime into

who handled

the

interview the cops, get the fact

complaint out of the

and hurry on to the next arrest.

ECAB manual,

The object of the assembly line

was to keep cases moving (Heilbroner, 1990, pg. 11).
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The

majority

of

crimes

considered petty crimes.
were farebeats--not
was discussed was

With this
That is,

ECAB

would wait

were

Another crime which

was called "stuff 'n'

were kids who

the perpetrators

through

a large number of crimes

paying the subway fare.

the crime which

token into the slot

came

For instance,

crime, there

with his mouth at

which

were into

token-sucking.

for someone

of the token machine and the

the slot to get the token out.

suck."

to insert
kid

a

would suck

If the kid was

lucky, he would sell the token for $1.00.

At ECAB, during his first week at work for the

DA;s office,

Heilbroner had filed more than one hundred complaints, he already
had a caseload of 150.
con men.
side

There were shoplifters, farebeaters, and

There were auto thieves breaking

streets.

There were street vendors selling imitation Rolex

watches for $25.00 {Heilbroner, 1990, pg.

the

arrest

into cars on ill-lit

reports

ranged

from

13).

victims

Further, some of

of

spousal

abuse,

prostitution, drug crimes, pickpocketers, shoplifting, and street

fighting.

Hence, the crimes too, are all considered petty crimes

but unfortunately,

all require

the same

amount of paper

work,

victim/witness interviews,

and police officer

of each and

Unfortunately though, cases moved

every crime.

briefs or reports

quick that there was really no time to seek justice.

so

It appeared

as if Assistant DA's only filed paper work.

In an area of the
which were more serious

assigned to a case which

book, Heilbroner discusses certain crimes
than petty crimes.

For

instance, while

required a hospital hearing, Heilbroner
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was to prosecute

a taxi

cab driver

who practically

customer's hand with a machete because

$9.00

for the cab

ride.

The

cut off

a

the customer did not have

cut was so severe

that the man's

hand was merely hanging from a piece of skin which was holding it
intact.

Heilbroner

disposed of.
the

gave examples

quite

both

which

If the

of

the cases

to settle

another crime.

felony

bargaining.

cases were

DA was pressed for time,

for a

defendant was punished

the

involved plea

misdemeanor and

often.

willing

how most

were

For instance, deals were made by the prosecutor and

defense lawyer

cases,

of

lesser

degree crime

somehow and not

An important issue

In

most

plea bargained

then he would be
as

long as

just set free to

the

commit

of plea bargaining, according

Assistant DA was that if defendants

had a serious rap sheet

{prior arrest and conviction record), then the likelihood of plea

bargaining was very limited.

For those defendants who did have a

rap sheet, their punishment usually
type of incarceration.
a

good

example

of

instantaneously.
did not want

sense,

In a section of the book, the author gave
defendant's

Defendants were plea

defendants

were forced

trial.

welcome to take their
judge

"copping

and DA

case to trial,
strive

"copping out"
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almost

In a

were perfectly

double

According

they

without the

they did not dare

for almost

went to trial.

pleas

not "cop out."

Though these defendants

would

sentences if the cases

into

out"

bargaining because

to do "hard time" if they did

opportunity of a

the

involved probation with some

because

or harsher

to Heilbroner,

plea

bargaining

causing

the

was somehow

city's

criminals to escape

crime

illegal

and immoral

problem.

Plea

just punishment,

the streets all that more quickly.

and possibly

bargaining

allowed

and return recidivists

But

to

could plea bargaining be

removed?

Heilbroner discussed a voir dire

look

for

the

best person/people

process in which attorneys

to

sin

in on

a

jury.

In

Heilbroner's words "voir dires are used to keep nuts off the jury

panel" (Heilbroner, pg.
be

70).

made of middle-class, middle-aged

held the same

job for a number

who have children.
don't mind

following orders

should be people who have
crime as the

good jury would

people, the types who have

of years, and

preferably, those

Jury members should be no/nonsense people who

(Heilbroner, 1990, pg 79).

of

For most cases, a

and have

a sake

Though it may

in the

community

be hard, jury

member

not been victimized for the same

one they are

going to hear.

type

Such people will

certainly be biased.

In the second part of the book, titled MADMEN AND FUGITIVES,

the author was assigned

to the Special Project Bureau.

Project deals with two area of prosecution
criminal courts

insanity

Special

rarely encountered in

and extradition cases.

With

insanity

cases, the M'Naughten Rule was formulated way back in 1843.
rule reasoned that an accused should

his crimes if

"the

not be held responsible for

"a disease of the mind"

nature and

quality of his

from wrong" (Heilbroner, 1990,

prevents him from knowing

acts" or
pg. 119).
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Such

distinguishing "right
While assigned

to the

Special Project

Bureau, Heilbroner

Psychiatric Center to prosecute
who

were

incarcerated

committing

extremely

at

was sent

to Kirby

cases for the state.

Kirby

violent,

Center

perverse

were

Forensic
All those

convicted

crimes,

have

for

entered

insanity pleas, and now spend their days inside closely monitored
wards

awaiting

the

"nondangerous".
were

For

incarcerated

moment

for arei

cold-bloodily

a

There

and took

some

murdered

people

of literally

because

of

who cut up her

anthropophagy--drinking their blood

various hospitals

least ten

for a

a nonsecurity

against her

the

to

two kids

to a

or eating

Ms. Appelsammy had been
years.

facility?

release

some

With this case, there was also

pg. 129).

decided

find

"little voices" telling them

a bath in their blood.

to

accused

the grandparents

their flesh (Heilbroner,

released

will

the crimes which

man was

was a Carolyn Appelsammy

evidence of

judge

There was a case of a mother and daughter

spiritual belief and because of
do so.

a

instance, some of

cutting up young boys.
who

when

Was she

The judge

fit to
of

minimum security

in
be

the case

facility.

Then, there was the case of Plutowskin who cold-bloodily murdered
a stranger who

asked to have sex

with him.

After

eight years.

the court decided that some violent tendencies still remained and
decided that the defendant/murderer was unfit to be classified as

"nondangerous"

due

hospital staff.

Throughout these cases, Heilbroner

these defendants were

to

some

violent

outbursts

really medically insane

beaten the system?
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against

the

wondered if

or had they

just

In the

third part

of the

discussed felony cases.

book titled

FELONS, the

The New York Penal Code defines a felony

as any offense punished by more than one year
thousand

dollar

fine.

assault meant a

or a kick

As

distinguished from

"butt"; larceny meant

of checks

rather than stealing

these crimes suffered serious

injury.

Robbery

elevators
these

victims

and assault

victims

petty

were

to

pantyhose.

crimes,

terrified of

see

twice;

once by

the

riding

to plastic

just

thousand
Victims of

physical, emotional, or

victims went

wanted

forging fifty

financial

alone

in

surgeons.

punishment

Unfortunately, these victims later began to
burned

in prison or a one

stab in the back rather than a punch in the nose

in the

dollars

author

meted

All
out.

feel as if they were

defendant and

once by

the system

because they were treated very harshly.

In

felony cases

lawyer was

mugged and

the author

beaten by

felony cases, there was much more
do.

They had to investigate

crime from robberies,

the

"no

one

a

crime.

Since

incident were

juveniles.

a

With

work for the assistant OA's to

more extensively the facts of each

DA's view every

is innocent"

(Heilbroner,

instance, the author discussed a case
were found on a

group of

physical abuses, rapes,

felony level, Assistant

crooks,

discusses an

and murders.

At

defendant as being
1990,

213).

For

where a man's credit cards

defendant that was being charged with

the owner never reported the

a robbery

cards stolen, it was

later found through investigation that the owner too, was selling
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drugs and letting the robbery defendant use the cards to purchase
the drugs with.

how

In concluding

his book, the author made many suggestions on

to

criminal

help

efficiently.
more of

the

justice

First of all, DA's

run

smoothly

and

should be encouraged to dismiss

the marginal misdemeanor

can receive the attention they

system

cases so that

deserve.

serious matters

Legalizing prostitution

and marijuana, even though politically unpopular, would also help
eliminate

thousands

neither judges nor
The

artificial

reformed.

more

petty

cases

each year;

cases

that

prosecutors take very seriously in any event.
misdemeanor-felony

For instance, one can punch

distinctions

should

be

fifty people in the face,

loosening teeth, blackening eyes, and yet, because the crimes are
misdemeanors, the perpetrator
for each assault.

In

cannot receive more than

contrast, a petty thief who steals

and credit cards faces a minimum
and a

maximum of life

officers

should

be

for his

fined

third offense.

every

or arrest a defendant.

should be

disciplined for the

time they

not meet its potential

sought.

Further, police

illegally

search,

Similarly, lawyers and judges

misrepresentations and

undue delays that jam the wheels of justice.
of the author is that the

purses

of fifteen to twenty-five years

question,

due to the quantity

one year

countless

Thus, the viewpoint

New York Criminal Justice System

to seek justice for every and

of crimes and

Of course, there are many
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does

all crimes

punishments which need to

be

ares which need to be changed

in

the

criminal justice

system, but

even

if such

areas were

changed, would such changes help reduce crime?
In an area of
victims

his book, Heilbroner discusses the

were "burned" twice.

criminal

In all

reality, most

fact that
if not all

justice literature stress the fact that victims are the

unfortunate

parties,

not

necessarily

because

they

have been

harmed by the defendants but because

in many instances, there is

not much

system can

other

that the

than

criminal justice

counsel

and

seek

restitution

According to the author, in all

The criminal justice system

more right and thus,
rather

than those

victims

their

behalf.

on

reality, the phrase "victims are

the forgotten people in the criminal
true.

do for

justice system, seems to be

seems to grant the defendants

better treatment to those who

who have

crime

committed upon

commit crime
them against

their will.

ROUGH

system, be

JUSTICE

gives a

it New York

portrayal

or California.

of any

criminal justice

In fact,

most criminal

justice system literature discuss the problems of the system such
as the backlogging of courts with the big quantity of cases which

must

and

be processed through

prisons does

used to

be the

fact, now the

not leave

them.

The

over-crowdedness of jails

any hopes for

main concern of

rehabilitation which

any correctional facility.

prison systems are considered merely

In

a punishment

and warehousing facility according to Heilbroner.

The author discusses many of the problems which occur in the
New York

Criminal Justice

System.
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But the

problems occur

in

every other state as well.

Most all law enforcement, courts, and

correction

very much

facilities are

most of the current

literature.

understaffed according

Thus, the author's

to

book serves

to portray the realities of any and all criminal justice systems.
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CONCLUSION

Though the primary goal of this analysis was to find ways to
help the

criminal justice

system operate

efficiently in the area of plea
plea

more effectively

and

bargaining, a complete change in

bargaining would seem to be

disastrous.

The fact that the

courtroom actors are not willing to change makes any changes with

plea bargaining that much more difficult.

In

addition, criminal

justice budgets may not allow changes in the near future.

One of

which

the

the goals

of this analysis

criminal justice

system

was to

find a

could operate

way in

without plea

bargaining, but, after review, abolishing plea bargaining in it's
entirety would, in fact, be a nightmare for those who work in the
system.
good,

Though

abolishing plea bargaining, on

its face, sounds

imagine what that would do to the caseload of the criminal

justice cases

which need

attention.

Each and

every defendant

would have a full scale trial with a long wait in jail before the
case would be

would

feel

considered.

guilty even

With

before

the long jail wait,

their

case gets

defendants

to

the court

docket.

Since plea bargaining cannot

be abolished, a

restructuring

of the process should strongly be considered, however.

Finding a

way to treat each and every defendant as equal should be adopted.
That is, defendants who commit certain crimes should have to do a
certain

amount

of time.

Sentences
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should

be

fixed

so that

discrimination would not occur with the meting out of punishment.

Upperworld and
example.
to

underworld crimes

should be

treated alike,

for

Plea bargaining or sentencing guidelines should be used

eliminate

Additionally,

the

disparate

judges could receive

Plea bargaining practices
allow the general

sentencing

process.
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occurs.

more training in sentencing.

should be reformed in

public to have

which

ways that would

a better understanding of

the
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